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LIPSTICK, LIGHT BEER, AND BACK-LOADED
SAVINGS ACCOUNTS
Karen C. Burke*
Grayson M.P. McCouch**
"We'd like to see as many advertisements for lifetime savings
accounts as we do for lipstick and light beer."1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTROD UCTION ........................................................................... 1102
II. TAX-PREFERRED RETIREMENT SAVING ................................ 1104
A . Evolution of IRA s ............................................................... 1105
B. Cash-Flow and Yield-Exempt Models .............................. 1109
III. THE ADMINISTRATION'S SAVINGS PROPOSALS ..................... 1116
A . LSA s and RSA s .................................................................. 1116
B . Interest G roups .................................................................... 1120
C. Interaction with Retirement Policy .................................... 1125
IV. INCOME TAX PERSPECTIVE ...................................................... 1127
A. Tax Expenditure Analysis .................................................. 1127
Warren Distinguished Professor, University of San Diego School of Law.
Professor, University of San Diego School of Law.
The authors thank Professor Edwin S. Cohen and participants at the March 2005
meeting of the Virginia Tax Study Group for a stimulating discussion of the proposed
savings accounts discussed in this article. They also acknowledge generous research
support from the University of San Diego School of Law.
Michael Kranish, Life Insurers Fighting Major Bush Initiative, BOSTON
GLOBE, Jan. 20, 2005, at C1 (quoting Pamela Olson, former Treasury Assistant
Secretary for Tax Policy).
1101
Virginia Tax Review
B. D istributional Eff ects .......................................................... 1130
C. Budgetary Eff ects ................................................................ 1133
V. CONSUMPTION TAX PERSPECTIVE ........................................... 1136
A. Debt-Financed Investm ents ................................................ 1138
B. Eff ect on Savings ................................................................. 1139
C. Incentives for Retirement Saving ....................................... 1142
D. Accumulating and Transmitting Wealth ........................... 1144
V I. C O NCLU SIO N ............................................................................... 1149
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years the Bush Administration has repeatedly
advanced proposals to expand opportunities for tax-preferred saving
beyond the targeted subsidies allowed under current law. Specifically,
the Administration envisions three new types of accounts - a
Lifetime Savings Account (LSA), a Retirement Savings Account
(RSA), and an Employer Retirement Savings Account (ERSA) -
that would profoundly alter the treatment of tax-preferred savings
Although these proposals are ostensibly intended to simplify the law
by consolidating numerous existing categories of tax-preferred
accounts, they also depart sharply from the traditional approach of
targeted tax incentives aimed at encouraging saving for retirement or
other specific purposes. In contrast to existing special-purpose savings
vehicles, funds in an LSA could be withdrawn at any time without
penalty and used for any purpose, including retirement, education,
health care, or other personal needs. In addition, RSAs would
increase contribution limits and lift restrictions on access to tax-
preferred individual retirement savings for high-income earners who
are already covered by a retirement plan. Similarly, ERSAs would
significantly relax existing restrictions on employer-sponsored
2 See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE
ADMINISTRATION'S FISCAL YEAR 2006 REVENUE PROPOSALS 5-15 (2005) [hereinafter
FY 2006 Revenue Proposals]; U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL
EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S FISCAL YEAR 2005 REVENUE PROPOSALS
7-17 (2004) [hereinafter FY 2005 Revenue Proposals]; U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY,
GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S FISCAL YEAR 2004 REVENUE
PROPOSALS 118-27 (2003) [hereinafter FY 2004 Revenue Proposals]; see also REPORT
OF THE PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM, SIMPLE, FAIR, AND
PRO-GROWTH: PROPOSALS TO FIX AMERICA'S TAX SYSTEM 107-21 (2005).
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retirement plans. Taken together, the new accounts would exempt
increasing amounts of capital income from taxation and eventually
shift a corresponding share of the tax burden onto labor income.
The existing federal income tax is widely viewed as a hybrid
system with significant consumption-type traits, including the cash-
flow treatment of retirement savings.3  In contrast, the
Administration's proposals adopt a yield-exempt model which
requires that contributions to an account be made with after-tax
dollars but allows the entire account balance (including investment
returns) to be withdrawn tax-free. While the two models of
consumption taxation may be theoretically equivalent in present valueS 4
terms under certain stylized assumptions, they lead to markedly
different results as a practical matter.5 In the long term, the yield-
exempt savings accounts promoted by the Administration are likely to
generate enormous revenue losses, exacerbate inequalities of income
and wealth, and potentially undermine broad-based coverage under
6
employer-sponsored retirement plans. Moreover, by removing
substantial amounts of savings from the tax base without addressing
the more difficult issue of interest expense, the Administration's
proposals are likely to impede efforts to achieve fundamental tax
reform.7
This article offers a critical assessment of the Administration's
savings proposals. Part II traces the expansion of individual
retirement accounts during the last thirty years, and probes the limits
3 See generally William D. Andrews & David F. Bradford, Savings Incentives in
a Hybrid Income Tax, in UNEASY COMPROMISE: PROBLEMS OF A HYBRID INCOME-
CONSUMPTION TAX 269 (Henry J. Aaron et al. eds., 1988).
4 See DAVID F. BRADFORD AND THE U.S. TREASURY TAX POLICY STAFF,
BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM 110-11 (2d ed. 1984) [hereinafter BLUEPRINTS].
5 The contemporary debate over consumption taxation focuses primarily on a
cash-flow model. See William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow
Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113 (1974); Joseph Bankman & Barbara H.
Fried, Winners and Losers in the Shift to a Consumption Tax, 86 GEO. L.J. 539 (1998);
Michael J. Graetz, Implementing a Progressive Consumption Tax, 92 HARV. L. REV.
1575 (1979); Edward J. McCaffery, A New Understanding of Tax, 103 MICH. L. REV.
807 (2005). Some proposals, however, appear to contemplate a yield-exempt model.
See David A. Weisbach, Ironing Out the Flat Tax, 52 STAN. L. REV. 599 (2000)
(discussing various proposals).
6 See Alan J. Auerbach et al., Reassessing the Fiscal Gap: The Role of Tax-
Deferred Saving, 100 TAX NOTES 567 (July 28, 2003); Leonard E. Burman et al., The
Administration's Savings Proposals: Preliminary Analysis, 98 TAX NOTES 1423 (Mar.
3, 2003).
7 See William G. Gale & Peter R. Orszag, An Economic Assessment of Tax
Policy in the Bush Administration, 2001-2004, 45 B.C. L. REV. 1157 (2004).
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of the present value equivalence between cash-flow and yield-exempt
treatment. Part III discusses the evolution of the Administration's
proposals in response to pressure from various business
constituencies, including the financial services and life insurance
industries as well as pension lobbying groups. Part IV evaluates the
Administration's proposals as tax expenditures under the existing
income tax system, focusing on distributional and budgetary
implications. Part V considers the proposals as a step in the direction
of a pure consumption tax system and argues that the yield-exempt
treatment of individual savings accounts runs counter to a well-
designed consumption tax. The article concludes that the
Administration's proposals reflect a dangerous blend of fiscal
recklessness, political opportunism, and misguided retirement policy.
II. TAX-PREFERRED RETIREMENT SAVING
Individual retirement accounts (IRAs) have emerged as a
principal vehicle for holding retirement savings. Today, they account
8for nearly one quarter of all retirement wealth. The growth of IRAs
is closely linked to the rise of defined contribution plans, especially
401(k) plans which allow voluntary pre-tax employee contributions,
and the corresponding shift away from defined benefit plans. 9 Indeed,
IRAs could never have achieved their current prominence without the
massive accumulation of retirement savings in 401(k)s that can be
rolled over tax-free to IRAs when employees retire or change
8 In 2001, IRAs accounted for $2.4 trillion (22.4%) of $10.69 trillion total
retirement savings, including both private-sector and public-sector assets. Craig
Copeland, IRA Assets and Characteristics of IRA Owners, 23 EBRI NOTES 1, 3-4
(2002).
9 Since the 1980s, the number of participants in defined contribution plans has
risen steadily, while the number of participants in defined benefit plans has declined
sharply, and by 2000 the value of assets held in defined contribution plans exceeded
the value of assets held in defined benefit plans. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON
TAXATION, 107TH CONG., PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO
EMPLOYER-SPONSORED DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLANS AND OTHER RETIREMENT
ARRANGEMENTS, at 31-38 (2002) (Joint Comm. Print 2002). Roughly half of all
private-sector workers participate in employment-based plans, a figure that has
remained remarkably constant since 1975. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION,
107TH CONG., PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING To EMPLOYER-
SPONSORED DEFINED BENEFIT PLANS, at 28 (2002) (Joint Comm. Print 2002);
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, UTILIZATION OF TAX INCENTIVES FOR
RETIREMENT SAVING 4-5 (2003) (crediting 401(k)s with "[a]ll of the growth in
defined-contribution plans" since 1975).
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employers. ° With the rise of IRAs and 401(k)s, individual employees
are increasingly exposed to the risks as well as the rewards of
investing their own retirement funds." Moreover, moderate- and
upper-income individuals may have been emboldened through early
experience with IRAs to take an active role in managing their
retirement assets, thus paving the way for the 401(k) revolution. 2
Defined contribution plans and IRAs have fostered a widespread view
of retirement savings accounts essentially as tax-subsidized all-
purpose investment vehicles for accumulating and transferring
wealth.13
A. Evolution of IRAs
IRAs were originally created by the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) to stimulate tax-deferred
retirement saving by individuals who were not covered by an
employer-sponsored qualified plan.i4 IRAs are technically distinct
from qualified employer plans, although they provide similar tax
deferral benefits. Contributions to a traditional IRA are deductible,
investment earnings accumulate tax free, and the individual owner is
not taxed until amounts are actually distributed. 5 In 1981 Congress
10 See I.R.C. § 402(c) (allowing tax-free rollover); ALICIA H. MUNNELL &
ANNIKA SUNDtN, COMING UP SHORT: THE CHALLENGE OF 401(K) PLANS 33 (2004)
(noting that most IRA assets are attributable to rollovers from 401(k)s).
11 A growing body of evidence, however, suggests that "most employees have
neither the training, the interest, nor the desire to become competent money
managers." Richard L. Kaplan, Enron, Pension Policy, and Social Security
Privatization, 46 ARIz. L. REV. 53, 83-85 (2004); see also MUNNELL & SUNDtN, supra
note 10, at 123 (noting that "most participants are not sophisticated investors").
12 Over half of all households with pension coverage rely exclusively on 401(k)s
and similar plans to supplement Social Security. See MUNNELL & SUNDEN, supra note
10, at 1; id. at 2 ("It has become a 401(k) world."); see also Edward A. Zelinsky, The
Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451, 454 (2004) (describing the
emergence of the "defined contribution society" as "a quiet, largely unheralded
revolution" with fundamental consequences for tax and social policy).
13 See John H. Langbein, Social Security and the Private Pension System, in IN
SEARCH OF RETIREMENT SECURITY: THE CHANGING MIX OF SOCIAL INSURANCE,
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS, AND INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY 109, 113 (Teresa Ghilarducci
et al. eds., 2005) (noting that the "term 'pension plan' is increasingly a misnomer for
defined contribution plans" which function as "multipurpose savings, investment, and
wealth transmission vehicles" for the well-to-do).
14 See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406,
§ 2002, 88 Stat. 829, 958-64 (codified, as amended, in I.R.C. §§ 219,408).
15 I.R.C. §§ 219(a), 408(e)(1), (d). The annual deductible amount is subject to
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lifted the ban on IRAs for individuals covered by qualified employer
plans,16 but this experiment with unlimited access to IRAs ended in
1986 when Congress imposed new income-based restrictions on IRAs
for individuals covered by qualified employer plans.17
The 1986 restrictions on IRAs were prompted by several factors.
Perhaps most importantly, unlimited access to IRAs proved to be
unexpectedly expensive in terms of lost revenue. 8 To maintain
revenue neutrality while slashing top income tax rates, it became
necessary to cut back on revenue losses from IRAs and other costly
tax incentives.' 9 The new restrictions also reflected a concern that the
1981 expansion of IRAs was excessively generous to high-income
taxpayers covered by qualified employer plans.2 From 1981 until
1986, when IRAs were universally available, the overall participation
rate remained relatively low, with the vast majority of contributions
concentrated among high-income taxpayers who received the greatest
21benefits from the tax incentive. Unsurprisingly, the tax incentive
drew a much weaker response from low- and moderate-income
taxpayers who faced lower marginal tax rates and more pressing needs
for current income.22
relatively strict limits, but an individual may make additional nondeductible
contributions. I.R.C. § 408(o). Nondeductible contributions result in deferral of tax
on the investment earnings and thus reduce the effective rate of tax. See JANE G.
GRAVELLE, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT
ACCOUNTS (IRAs): ISSUES, PROPOSED EXPANSION, AND RETIREMENT SAVINGS
ACCOUNTS (RSAs) 3 n.1 (2000).
16 Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 311(a), 95 Stat. 172,
274 (amending I.R.C. § 219).
17 I.R.C. § 219(g), added by Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514,
§ 1101(a)(1), 100 Stat. 2085, 2411 (disallowing deductible IRAs for "active
participants" in qualified employer plans with income above specified levels).
18 The revenue loss from the 1981 expansion of IRAs was six times greater than
originally estimated. See Michael J. Graetz, The Troubled Marriage of Retirement
,Security and Tax Policies, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 896 (1987).
19 See id. at 897; id. at 898 n.188 ("The requirement of revenue neutrality in the
1986 legislation caused the direct linkage of tax rates and tax expenditures in the
retirement savings context.")
20 See S. REP. No. 99-313, at 5 (1986) (describing tax treatment of IRAs as
"unnecessarily generous for individuals who participate in other tax-favored
retirement arrangements").
21 In 1986, only 15% of all tax returns reported IRA contributions, but 54% of
taxpayers in the top 10% of the income distribution and 70% of taxpayers in the top
1% made contributions. The top one-third of individual tax returns accounted for
82% of IRA deductions. See GRAVELLE, supra note 15, at 9.
22 In 1986, only 2% of taxpayers in the bottom third of the income distribution
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Congress was also concerned with the limited success of IRAs in
stimulating new private saving. During the early 1980s, universal
access to IRAs combined with aggressive marketing by financial
institutions apparently induced many individuals to shift assets toS 23
IRAs from other vehicles, but these contributions failed to generate
a significant net increase in private saving. To stimulate new private
saving, it would be necessary to curtail consumption that would
otherwise have occurred. While the effect of 401(k)s and IRAs on
24
overall saving remains uncertain, the general consensus is that these
arrangements may encourage some new saving by low- and moderate-
income earners who have few assets to shift, but they have little or no
21positive effect on net saving by high-income earners. In effect, IRAs
26
represent a subsidy for new deposits rather than new saving. Since
high-income earners may be expected to respond to the tax incentive
by shifting existing assets or diverting assets that they would have
saved in any event, rather than by reducing consumption, the net
and 9% in the middle third made contributions. See id. The response to IRAs
suggests that the tax incentive is "unlikely to influence many low or moderate
earners." Daniel I. Halperin, Special Tax Treatment for Employer-Based Retirement
Programs: Is It "Still" Viable as a Means of Increasing Retirement Income? Should It
Continue?, 49 TAX L. REV. 1, 13 (1993).
23 See Graetz, supra note 18, at 898.
24 There is substantial literature addressing the impact of IRAs and 401(k)s on
pivate and national saving. A few studies find that 45% or more of all IRA
contributions represent new saving, but most others conclude that the net addition to
saving is significantly smaller or even nonexistent; the findings concerning 401(k)
contributions are similar. See Auerbach et al., supra note 6, at 580-81 (reviewing
literature on IRAs and 401(k)s); JANE G. GRAVELLE & MAXIM SHVEDOV,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, PROPOSED SAVINGS ACCOUNTS: ECONOMIC
AND BUDGETARY EFFECTS 10-12 (2005) (discussing the debate over IRAs and noting
that "there was no overall increase in the savings rate during the period that IRAs
were universally available, despite large contributions to IRAs"); see also Orazio P.
Attanasio & Thomas DeLeire, The Effect of Individual Retirement Accounts on
Household Consumption and National Saving, 112 ECON. J. 504, 507 (2002) (finding
that increase in IRA contributions from 1982 to 1986 "was primarily financed from
reshuffled assets and saving that would have been done anyway and was not new
saving"); William G. Gale & John Karl Scholz, IRAs and Household Saving, 84 AM.
ECON. REV. 1233, 1253 (1994) (concluding that "increasing IRA contribution limits
between 1983 and 1986 would have resulted in little if any net increase in national
saving").
25 See MUNNELL & SUNDtN, supra note 10, at 141 (discussing 401(k)s).
26 In 2003, tax expenditures for retirement savings for the first time exceeded
total personal saving, which has declined dramatically since the early 1980s. See
Elizabeth Bell et al., Retirement Saving Incentives and Personal Saving, 105 TAX
NOTES 1689 (Dec. 20, 2004).
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result may be a tax shelter that loses revenue without increasing
overall private saving.
Despite the restrictions imposed in 1986, IRA proponents
repeatedly pressed for looser eligibility requirements and contribution
limits. 27 Initially, these demands were frustrated by the congressional
budget enforcement rules, which required revenue offsets for new tax
28incentives. As the budget outlook improved during the following
decade, however, Congress embraced the opportunity to relax the
eligibility requirements for deductible IRAs and create new
exceptions permitting penalty-free withdrawals for nonretirement
29purposes. More importantly, in 1997 Congress authorized a new
type of individual account, known as the Roth IRA, which became
available to all employees subject to lenient income-based
restrictions. °
In general, a Roth IRA is a mirror image of a traditional IRA: no
deduction is allowed for contributions to a Roth IRA, investment
earnings accumulate tax-free, and qualified distributions are
nontaxable." Because contributions generate no upfront deduction,
Roth IRAs are often described as "back-loaded" to distinguish them
from traditional or "front-loaded" IRAs. In cash-flow budgetary
terms, Roth IRAs defer revenue losses until future years when owners
27 See GRAVELLE, supra note 15, at 14-16 (describing proposals to expand
IRAs).
28 See generally ALLEN SCHICK, THE FEDERAL BUDGET: POLITICS, POLICY,
PROCESS 48-73 (rev. ed. 2000) (discussing budget enforcement rules).
29 See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. 104-191,
§ 361(a), 110 Stat. 1936, 2071 (1996) (amending I.R.C. § 72(t) to allow penalty-free
withdrawals for medical expenses); Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub.
L. 104-188, § 1427(a), (b), 110 Stat. 1755, 1802 (amending spousal IRA provisions of
I.R.C. § 219(c)); Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, §§ 2 03(a), (b),
301(a), (b) and 303(a), (b), 111 Stat. 788, 809, 824, 825, 829 (amending eligibility
requirements of I.R.C. § 219(g) and amending I.R.C. § 72(t) to allow penalty-free
withdrawals for higher education expenses and first-time home purchases).
30 See Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 302(a), 111 Stat. 788,
825 (codified, as amended, at I.R.C. § 408A). The Roth IRA bears the name of its
principal sponsor, the late Senator William Roth of Delaware. The maximum
contribution that can be made to a Roth IRA is phased out for single individuals with
adjusted gross income between $95,000 and $110,000 and for married couples with
adjusted gross income between $150,000 and $160,000. See I.R.C. § 408A(c)(3)(A)
and (C).
31 See I.R.C. § 408A(c)(1) and (d). In general, once five years have elapsed since
the initial funding of a Roth IRA, distributions are nontaxable if made on or after the
date the owner reaches age 59 or dies or becomes disabled. I.R.C. § 408A(d)(2)(A).
Nontaxable distributions are also allowed for first-time home purchases. Id.
1108
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withdraw their accumulated account balances tax-free. The revenue
effects of front-loaded and back-loaded accounts may be equivalent in
present value terms, but the budget rules generally require that
Congress take account of the cash-flow effects of tax expenditures
only over a five-year budget window." This timing gimmick permitted
Roth IRA proponents to minimize the short-term budget costs and
avoid taking the inevitable long-term revenue shortfalls into account.33
The back-loaded approach has also spawned an array of tax-preferred
special purpose savings accounts that encourage individuals to set
aside funds to meet the costs of medical care and higher education.34
Recent proposals to expand the Roth IRA model still further may
portend fundamental changes in the structure of the federal tax
system.
B. Cash-Flow and Yield-Exempt Models
The consumption tax literature includes extensive discussions of
two alternative models of a consumption tax: the immediate-
32 The 1997 provisions introducing Roth IRAs and relaxing eligibility
requirements for traditional IRAs were originally estimated to cost $1.8 billion in lost
revenue over a five-year period and $20.2 billion over a ten-year period. See STAFF
OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, ESTIMATED BUDGET EFFECTS OF THE CONFERENCE
AGREEMENT ON THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF H.R. 2014, THE TAXPAYER RELIEF
ACT OF 1997 2 (Joint Comm. Print 1997).
33 Commentators were quick to point out the budget gimmickry of the Roth
IRA provisions. See Daniel Halperin, I Want A Roth IRA for Xmas, 81 TAX NOTES
1567, 1567 (Dec. 21, 1998) ("The Roth IRA is the antithesis of sensible tax and
budget policy.... The main purpose... was to hide the budget cost."); Gene
Steuerle, Be Wary of Economic Proclamations on Back-loaded IRAs, 76 TAX NOTES
1775, 1775 (Sept. 29, 1997) ("Almost everyone recognizes that [Roth IRAs] were
enacted partly because of perverse budget accounting that does not take into account
long-term effects on the deficit."); see also EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, FAIR NOT FLAT:
HOW TO MAKE THE TAX SYSTEM BETTER AND SIMPLER 50 (2002) ("Because Roth-
style plans collect taxes now and forswear them later, present members of Congress
prefer them to postpaid consumption tax models, where the tax is collected on
someone else's watch.").
. See I.R.C. §§ 220 (medical savings accounts, added in 1996), 529 (qualified
tuition plans, added in 1996) and 530 (education savings accounts, added in 1997).
Contributions to a medical savings account are deductible, investment earnings are
tax-exempt, and distributions are tax-free if used to pay qualifying medical expenses.
Thus, medical savings accounts replicate the favorable tax treatment of employer-
provided health care. Cf I.R.C. § 223 (health savings accounts, added in 2003). For
discussions of Roth IRAs and their role in spawning newer special purpose savings
accounts, see McCaffery, supra note 5, at 902-03; Zelinsky, supra note 12, at 490-99.
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deduction (cash-flow) model and the yield-exempt model.35 A cash-
flow consumption tax resembles a front-loaded traditional IRA: the
cost of all investments is immediately deductible, and tax is deferred
until assets are withdrawn for consumption. In contrast, a yield-
exempt consumption tax resembles a back-loaded Roth IRA: no
upfront deduction is allowed, but all investment returns are tax-free.
It is well established that, under specified assumptions, the two
models produce identical after-tax outcomes in present value terms.36
However, this theoretical equivalence cannot be accepted without
important qualifications.
The theoretical equivalence between cash-flow and yield-exempt
treatment rests on several profoundly unrealistic assumptions.37 Most
importantly, the equivalence assumes a uniform, invariable rate of tax.
If tax rates are progressive or vary over time, the equivalence is
38destroyed. In the case of retirement savings, the assumption of a
constant tax rate is especially problematic because the lengthy
accumulation period increases the likelihood of intervening rate
changes. Moreover, income that is deferred until after retirement is
often taxed at lower marginal rates than during peak earning years.
Depending on their particular circumstances and expectations
concerning future tax rates, individuals may have ex ante reasons to
prefer either cash-flow or yield-exempt treatment. Nevertheless,
much of the consumption tax literature assumes a flat rate structure
and thus ignores significant differences between the two models when
rates are progressive or fluctuate over time.
The cash-flow and yield-exempt models also differ in their
treatment of certain investment returns in excess of the normal rate of
return (i.e., inframarginal returns).39 The cash-flow model treats the
35 See, e.g., BLUEPRINTS, supra note 4, at 101-03, 110-18 (relying on equivalence
to specify rules for implementing alternative forms of consumption tax); Graetz, supra
note 5, at 1598-611.
See Andrews, supra note 5, at 1126; Graetz, supra note 5, at 1598; Alvin C.
Warren, Jr., The Timing of Taxes, 39 NAT'L TAX J. 499, 499-500 (1986).
37 See Graetz, supra note 5, at 1602-04 (discussing "unrealistic conditions" for
equivalence); Steuerle, supra note 33, at 1775 (noting that economists demonstrate
equivalence using "simple equations that, while mathematically correct, fail to reflect
reality").
See Graetz, supra note 5, at 1602.
39 The return on an investment is inframarginal "if one cannot invest additional
cash at the same rate." Weisbach, supra note 5, at 605. Recent academic analysis has
focused on the treatment of various components of capital income under an income
tax compared to a consumption tax. The literature emphasizes that the principal
economic difference between the two types of taxes is that a consumption tax, unlike
[Vol. 25:11011110
2006] Lipstick, Light Beer, and Back-Loaded Savings Accounts 1111
government as a co-venturer entitled to a ratable share of any
inframarginal returns, while the yield-exempt model exempts both
normal and inframarginal returns.40 An investor who receives an
immediate deduction under the cash-flow model cannot fully "gross
up" the investment by the amount of the resulting tax savings.4' In
effect, the government is entitled to a ratable share (equal to the tax
rate) of any inframarginal investment, and the investor's share is
limited to the balance of the inframarginal investment.42  In contrast,
under the yield-exempt model, any inframarginal returns belong
entirely to the investor. Thus, the cash-flow and yield-exempt models
are not equivalent where speculative investment opportunities are
limited or yields vary according to the magnitude of the investment.43
an income tax, exempts the risk-free return to capital, which historically has been
quite low. See Daniel N. Shaviro, Replacing the Income Tax With a Progressive
Consumption Tax, 103 TAX NOTES 91, 101 (Apr. 5, 2004); see also id. at 100 n.38
(citing extensive literature). A further insight is that, under specified assumptions,
neither an income tax nor a consumption tax reaches marginal returns to risk because
individuals can adjust their portfolios to offset the effect of the tax on risky returns.
See Joseph Bankman & Barbara H. Fried, supra note 5, at 542-44; see also David A.
Weisbach, The (Non) Taxation of Risk, 58 TAx L. REV. 1, 8 (2004) (noting that, under
an income tax, taxing gains and deducting losses "reduces the variance in outcomes
from taking a bet," but that individuals can restore the pretax variance simply by
increasing the size of the bet). See generally Joseph Bankman & David A. Weisbach,
The Superiority of an Ideal Consumption Tax Over an Ideal Income Tax (U. Chi. John
M. Olin L. & Econ. Working Paper No. 251, 2005).
40 See McCaffery, supra note 5, at 826-27 (explaining that only postpaid
consumption tax reaches "windfall" returns). Unlike a yield-exempt consumption tax
that explicitly exempts all returns to capital, both an accretion-type income tax and a
cash-flow consumption tax reach inframarginal returns as well as any wages
masquerading as returns to capital. See Weisbach, supra note 5, at 608-09 (noting
that there may be "large differences" between yield exempt and cash-flow
consumption taxes to the extent it is difficult to "adequately police the border
between wages and capital").
41 By hypothesis, any tax savings must be invested at a lower rate than the
inframarginal return on the original investment. See Weisbach, supra note 5, at 605-
06.
42 See Graetz, supra note 5, at 1603 (noting that, under the cash-flow model, the
government "invests a percentage equal to the taxpayer's marginal tax rate in each
venture"); see also Weisbach, supra note 5, at 606 n.11.
43 This occurs, for example, when the tax savings from deducting the cost of an
investment cannot be invested at the same rate of return as the original investment.
The equivalence between the cash-flow and yield-exempt models depends crucially
on the assumption that individuals can costlessly gross up investments without
diminishing the marginal rate of return. See Shaviro, supra note 39, at 99.
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When the conditions for equivalence hold, both traditional IRAs
and Roth IRAs exempt the yield on the owner's after-tax investment.
For example, assume that an individual in a 30% marginal tax bracket
has $100 of earnings that can be invested in either type of account. If
the individual places the entire $100 in a traditional IRA and claims a
deduction for the contribution, the government in effect becomes a
co-venturer with a 30% share in the investment. If the account
doubles in value to $200, the entire balance is subject to tax when
withdrawn from the account.44  After paying tax of $60 on the
distribution (30% x $200), the individual is left with $140 of after-tax
retirement savings. Alternatively, if the individual chooses a Roth
IRA, the $100 of earnings are subject to an immediate tax of $30,
leaving an initial contribution of $70. If the account doubles in value,
the entire amount may be withdrawn tax-free, again leaving the
taxpayer with $140 of after-tax retirement savings. The initial
contribution to the Roth IRA is made with after-tax dollars and is
therefore less than the equivalent pre-tax contribution to the
traditional IRA.
In this example, allowing a deduction for the full amount of the
initial pre-tax contribution to a traditional IRA ($100) is equivalent to
imposing a tax on the contribution and exempting the yield on the
amount remaining after tax ($70).45 The arrangement could be recast
as a joint venture in which the individual initially invests $70 and the
government invests $30, and both contributions double in value. The
end result is the same as if the government collected an immediate tax
of $30 and invested that amount at a rate of return equal to the yield
on the traditional IRA. Assuming a uniform, invariable tax rate, the
only difference is whether the government collects $30 of tax upfront
or $60 of tax upon withdrawal. The difference is merely one of timing;
the immediate and deferred taxes are equivalent in present value
terms.46 The individual who makes an after-tax contribution to a Roth
IRA may be viewed as having "prepaid" the tax that would otherwise
be due upon withdrawal of the account balance. Thus, the yield-
exempt and cash-flow models of taxing consumption are often
referred to, respectively, as the prepaid and postpaid models.47
44 Assuming a 7.2% pre-tax rate of return, the investment will double in value in
approximately ten years.
45 See Andrews, supra note 5, at 1126; Graetz, supra note 5, at 1598.
46 Under the cash-flow model, the amount of the deferred tax ($60) is identical
to the compounded value of the individual's original tax savings ($30).
47 See BLUEPRINTS, supra note 4, at 110-11; McCaffery, supra note 5, at 811.
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The present value equivalence does not hold if the tax rate
changes during the interval between contribution and withdrawal 8 In
general, a traditional IRA performs better than a Roth IRA if the tax
rate is higher at the time contributions are made than when
withdrawals occur.49 In the above example, assume that the tax rate
falls from 30% to 10% by the time the individual withdraws the
balance of the traditional IRA. The tax on the $200 withdrawal
amounts to only $20 (rather than $60), leaving the individual with
after-tax retirement savings of $180, or $40 more than if she chose a
Roth IRA. The result would be reversed if the tax rate rose to 50%
by the time of withdrawal, because the tax on the $200 withdrawal
would amount to $100, leaving the individual with only $100 after tax,
or $40 less than if she had chosen a Roth IRA.
In the case of a Roth IRA, changes in the tax rate after the time
of contribution are irrelevant because the effective tax rate on
earnings from a Roth IRA is always zero.50 In contrast, the effective
rate of tax on a traditional IRA is zero only if the tax rate remains
unchanged from the time of contribution until withdrawal. If the
applicable tax rate on withdrawal is lower (or higher) than at the time
of contribution, the effective tax rate on the traditional IRA is
negative (or positive).5 ' A negative effective tax rate implies that the
individual receives a tax reduction windfall because she can withdraw
funds at a lower tax rate than the rate prevailing at the time of
contribution. Many individuals who made contributions to traditional
IRAs before 1986 received just such a windfall when they
subsequently withdrew their account balances after a drop in the
applicable tax rate. 2
48 See GRAVELLE, supra note 15, at 3 (noting that the tax treatment of front-
loaded and back-loaded accounts may differ "if tax rates vary over time, if the dollar
ceilings are the same, and if premature withdrawals are made").
49 Even if the tax rate declines between contribution and withdrawal, a back-
loaded account may nevertheless be preferable to a front-loaded account due to other
factors. See Leonard E. Burman et al., The Taxation of Retirement Saving: Choosing
Between Front-Loaded and Back-Loaded Options, 54 NAT'L TAX J. 689, 690 (2001).
For example, if nominal contribution limits are identical, a back-loaded account is
more generous than a front-loaded account. See infra notes 53-56 and accompanying
text.
50 See Burman et al., supra note 49, at 690.
51 See id. (defining effective tax rate as "the accrual rate of taxation on a
nondeductible investment that would yield the same end-of-horizon asset balance as
the IRA does"); GRAVELLE, supra note 15, at 3-4.
52 See Burman et al., supra note 49, at 690-91 (finding a negative average
effective tax rate on IRA contributions made in 1982 and withdrawn in 1995 due to
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When the nominal contribution limits for a traditional IRA and a
• 53
Roth IRA are identical, the Roth IRA shelters a larger investment.
For example, assume that the nominal contribution limit for both
accounts is $5,000. For an individual in a 30% marginal tax bracket,
the $5,000 pre-tax investment in the traditional IRA is equivalent to a
$3,500 after-tax investment in the Roth IRA. If both investments
double, the individual will be left with $7,000 in the traditional IRA
($10,000 less $3,000 tax54) and $7,000 in the Roth IRA (assuming a
$3,500 after-tax contribution). In effect, the government is entitled to
30% of the investment in the traditional IRA, reflecting the built-in
tax liability, and the individual is entitled to the remaining 70%. Thus,
the individual is better off contributing $5,000 (the nominal limit)
after tax to the Roth IRA, since she is not forced to share any portion
of the tax-exempt return with the government.55 To preserve parity
between the two accounts, the contribution limit for the Roth IRA
would have to be only 70% (100% less the individual's 30% marginal
tax rate) of the contribution limit for the traditional IRA.56
The back-loaded or yield-exempt approach imposes similar tax
burdens on individuals with similar ex ante opportunities in present
value terms but ignores enormous variations in actual investment
outcomes.57 For example, assume that two individuals in the same tax
bracket contribute $1,000 after tax to their respective Roth IRAs and
pursue different investment strategies. One account performs well
and increases in value to $5,000 at the time of withdrawal; the other
reduction in overall tax rates during this period).
53 For an individual with a marginal tax rate of 30%, a back-loaded account
shelters the entire amount of the contribution but a front-loaded account shelters only
70% of the account. In effect, the remaining 30% of the account belongs to the
government due to the built-in liability for tax on withdrawal. Thus, if tax rates
remain constant over time, the back-loaded account is generally preferable. See id. at
693.
54 The $3,000 tax represents the doubling of the government's investment of
$1,500 (reflecting the built-in tax liability at the time of contribution).
55 In the traditional IRA, the government's 30% share displaces $1,500 of tax
savings which must be invested outside the account at an after-tax rate of return.
56 Since the relative size of the equivalent Roth IRA varies according to the
individual's marginal tax rate, a Roth IRA provides a disproportionately large tax
benefit for higher-income earners who contribute the maximum amount. See
GRAVELLE, supra note 15, at 4. For example, for an individual in a 50% marginal tax
bracket, a $5,000 investment in a Roth IRA is equivalent to a $10,000 investment in a
traditional IRA.
57 See Gene Steuerle, Back-Loaded IRAs: Head Taxes Replace Income and
Consumption Taxes, 77 TAX NOTES 109, 109 (Oct. 6, 1997) (noting that "individuals
with vastly different amounts of success will pay similar or the same amount of tax").
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declines to $500. Although both individuals made identical
contributions and paid the same amount of tax, one enjoys $5,000 of
prepaid consumption while the other ends up with only $500. Thus,
under the back-loaded approach, the effective tax rate on realized
income and actual consumption is lower for lucky investors than for
unlucky ones.58
In contrast, the front-loaded or cash-flow approach defers
taxation until amounts are actually consumed, thereby mitigating
•59
after-tax disparities between lucky and unlucky investors. Such an
ex post perspective is consistent with traditional notions of ability to
pay, which would apportion the tax burden according to relative
standards of living.60 Thus, a cash-flow approach reflecting ex post
outcomes may be viewed as fairer than a yield-exempt approach
based on ex ante expectations. Moreover, to the extent that
progressivity remains desirable as a matter of tax policy, the cash-flow
approach can readily accommodate a graduated rate structure, while
the yield-exempt approach generally assumes a single flat rate of tax.61
58 See BLUEPRINTS, supra note 4, at 115-16 (noting that a "lucky investor...
would incur no additional tax liability on the extra future consumption out of any
positive payoff" while "unlucky investors will have prepaid a tax on expected returns
and will then obtain no deduction for the losses they incur"); Steuerle, supra note 57,
at 110 (noting that successful investors pay lower rates of tax on both income and
consumption, and concluding that back-loaded IRAs "resemble more of a 'head' tax
than a traditional income or consumption tax").
59 See Graetz, supra note 5, at 1602; cf. Weisbach, supra note 39, at 29 ("Perhaps
the intuition about taxing winners more than losers is related to inframarginal
returns.").
60 See Graetz, supra note 5, at 1600-01 (describing the ex ante approach as a
"radical departure" from traditional notions of horizontal and vertical equity, and
concluding that "once an expenditure tax with progressive rates is chosen the tax must
be imposed with regard to actual, not expected, consumption"); Alvin C. Warren,
Would a Consumption Tax Be Fairer Than an Income Tax?, 89 YALE L.J. 1081, 1098
(1980) (positing that "fairness in taxation should depend on outcomes, not
expectations").
61 See Andrews, supra note 5, at 1174-75 (noting that in a cash-flow
consumption tax, rates and personal exemptions can be adjusted to achieve the
desired degree of progressivity); McCaffery, supra note 5, at 812 ("A progressive
postpaid consumption tax emerges as the fairest and least arbitrary of all
comprehensive tax systems, precisely because it chooses to make its decisions about
the appropriate level of progressivity at the right time."); id. at 817 (arguing that "a
prepaid consumption tax.., falling exclusively on wages, jeopardizes America's
historic commitment to at least moderate progression in the distribution of tax
burdens").
Virginia Tax Review [Vol. 25:1101
In sum, the theoretical equivalence between the cash-flow and
yield-exempt models rests on unrealistic assumptions that are unlikely
62to be met in the real world. Indeed, the theoretical equivalence
masks potentially significant differences in the practical implications
of the two models. In assessing recent proposals for expanding tax-
preferred savings accounts, it is important to bear in mind that a
choice between the cash-flow and yield-exempt approaches may have
serious long-term budgetary consequences, and may also affect the
distribution of financial risks and rewards among investors.
III. THE ADMINISTRATION'S SAVINGS PROPOSALS
Expanded access to tax-preferred private savings accounts has
featured prominently in the Administration's recent annual budget
proposals. 6' The Administration's proposals would introduce a new
Lifetime Savings Account (LSA) available to all individuals,
regardless of age or income, and would replace both traditional and
Roth IRAs with a so-called Retirement Savings Account (RSA). In
addition, 401(k)s and similar employer-sponsored plans would be
consolidated in an Employer Retirement Savings Account (ERSA).64
A. LSAs and RSAs
The LSA marks a significant departure from the conventional
61 See William D. Andrews, Fairness and the Personal Income Tax: A Reply to
Professor Warren, 88 HARv. L. REV. 947, 953 (1975) (noting that the equivalence
depends on specified conditions, and suggesting that its "chief interest lies in the way
in which the conditions are not met").
61 See FY 2006 Revenue Proposals, supra note 2, at 5-15; FY 2005 Revenue
Proposals, supra note 2, at 7-17; FY 2004 Revenue Proposals, supra note 2, at 118-27.
(A The proposals would redesignate existing 401(k)s and thrift plans as ERSAs.
Other types of defined contribution plans, including 403(b) and 457 plans, would also
be eligible for redesignation as ERSAs. Alternatively, such plans could continue in
their current form but would not be allowed to receive any new contributions.
ERSAs would be taxed in the same manner, with respect to contributions and
distributions, as the plans they replaced. Thus, depending on the design of the
particular plan, an ERSA might be either front-loaded or back-loaded. Employees
would be allowed to make elective contributions up to the current limit for 401(k)
plans ($15,000 in 2006), and total annual contributions to an ERSA (including
employer and employee contributions) for an employee would be limited, as under
current law, to the lesser of 100% of the employee's compensation or $42,000
(indexed for inflation). See FY 2006 Revenue Proposals, supra note 2, at 13-14. The
proposals would also generally relax the nondiscrimination rules of current law. See
id. at 14-15; see also infra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
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approach of targeted tax incentives aimed at promoting saving for
specific purposes such as higher education, medical care and
retirement security. In contrast to existing special-purpose vehicles,
the funds in an LSA could be withdrawn by the owner at any time for
any purpose, without penalties or restrictions." The RSA would
resemble an LSA, except that withdrawals made prior to age 58,
death, or disability would be subject to a penalty.66 Both types of
accounts would permit after-tax contributions of up to $5,000 per
year.6 ' By contributing $20,000 to an LSA and $10,000 to an RSA, a
married couple with two children could set aside up to $30,000 each
year in the combined accounts. 68
Under the proposals, LSAs and RSAs would be available to all
individuals. Unlike traditional and Roth IRAs, the new accounts
would not be subject to eligibility restrictions based on age, income, or
qualified plan coverage. 69 Both LSAs and RSAs would follow the
back-loaded Roth IRA model of taxation: contributions would be
nondeductible, investment earnings would be tax-exempt, and
withdrawals would generally be tax-free. To encourage consolidation
of existing accounts, Roth IRAs would be redesignated as RSAs,7° and
65 See FY 2006 Revenue Proposals, supra note 2, at 9.
6 Early distributions from an RSA would be treated the same as nonqualified
distributions from a Roth IRA, i.e., includible in gross income and subject to a 10%
penalty tax only to the extent they exceeded amounts previously contributed. See id.
at 8-9; cf I.R.C. §§ 72(t), 408A(a), (d).
67 The $5,000 annual contribution limit would apply to all LSAs held in an
individual's name, rather than to each individual contributor. Thus, individuals could
contribute up to $5,000 each year to their own LSAs as well as LSAs held in the name
of other individuals, but total contributions to an LSA held in the name of any
individual would be limited to $5,000 per year. See FY 2006 Revenue Proposals,
supra note 2, at 9. In the case of an RSA, the maximum annual contribution limit for
an individual would be $5,000 (or the individual's earned income, if less); a married
couple could contribute up to $10,000 (or the couple's combined earned income, if
less). See id. at 8-9. The $5,000 contribution limit was reduced' from $7,500 as
originally proposed. See FY 2004 Revenue Proposals, supra note 2, at 119-20.
68 Assuming annual contributions of $30,000 and a 6% pre-tax annual rate of
return, the combined accounts would grow to nearly $400,000 over a ten-year period.
69 Cf I.R.C. §§ 219(b)-(g) (restricting deductible contributions to traditional
IRAs based on income, age, and qualified plan coverage), 408A(c)(3) (prohibiting
contributions to Roth IRAs for individuals or married couples with adjusted gross
income above specified amounts).
70 The income-based restrictions applicable to Roth IRA conversions under
current law would not apply. See FY 2006 Revenue Proposals, supra note 2, at 9; cf.
I.R.C. § 408A(c)(3)(B)(i) (prohibiting conversion for individuals with adjusted gross
income over $100,000).
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traditional IRAs would be convertible to RSAs at the owner's
option.7 ' No new contributions to traditional IRAs would be1 2
permitted. Converting a traditional IRA to an RSA would be
especially attractive for high-income individuals, despite the income
tax toll charge, because the new back-loaded account would shelter a
larger investment than the original front-loaded account and would
also avoid mandatory distributions during the owner's life.
73
The Administration claims that its proposals will encourage
saving and simplify the tax law by allowing existing accounts to be
consolidated into new accounts.7' There is reason for skepticism on
both counts. Any increase in net private saving is likely to be small, as
well as highly concentrated among high-income individuals and costly
in terms of long-term revenue loss. 75  Furthermore, the promised
benefits of simplification remain elusive. Instead of streamlining the
existing panoply of special-purpose, tax-preferred savings vehicles, the
new back-loaded accounts may merely add to their number.
76
71 Upon conversion, the balance in a traditional IRA (less any basis attributable
to nondeductible contributions) would be subject to income tax. See FY 2006
Revenue Proposals, supra note 2, at 9. Amounts converted from a traditional IRA
(or a front-loaded ERSA) to an RSA would be subject to a five-year holding period.
Distributions attributable to a conversion, if made before the end of the five-year
period (or before age 58, or death or disability, if earlier) would be subject to a 10%
penalty tax. See id. (providing ordering rules).
72 New traditional IRAs could nevertheless be established to accommodate
rollovers from front-loaded qualified employer plans. See id. at 9.
73 See id. at 8. The absence of mandatory distributions during the owner's life
mimics the treatment of Roth IRAs under current law. After the owner's death, an
RSA would presumably be subject to the same required minimum distribution rules
as a Roth IRA. Cf I.R.C. §§ 401(a)(9), 408(a)(6), 408A(a), (c)(5) (requiring
minimum distributions during owner's life and after death, but exempting Roth IRAs
during owner's life).
74 See FY 2006 Revenue Proposals, supra note 2, at 7 (noting the "complexity
and redundancy" caused by the "plethora of individual savings accounts, each subject
to different rules regarding eligibility, contributions, tax treatment, and withdrawal").
75 See infra notes 139-52 and 171-78 and accompanying text.
76 Amounts currently held in section 529 qualified tuition plans and Coverdell
education savings accounts could be converted tax-free to LSAs, subject to certain
limitations. See FY 2006 Revenue Proposals, supra note 2, at 9-10. Under the
proposal, section 529 plans would continue to exist but could be offered in the form of
an LSA, subject to the annual LSA contribution limit (but free of the additional
reporting requirements for section 529 plans and the income tax and penalties on
distributions for noneducational purposes). See id. at 10. While some financial
advisers have expressed concern that LSAs might drive out these types of savings,
others see no reason why LSAs cannot "live side by side" with section 529 plans. See
Dorothy Hinchcliff, Bush Tax Proposals Would Affect College Saving, FIN. ADVISOR,
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Currently, the benefits of section 529 plans and Coverdell education
savings accounts tend to be concentrated in a group with relatively
high levels of income, education, wealth, and savings." Wealthy
individuals could escape the restrictions on distributions from an
existing section 529 plan for noneducational purposes by transferring
up to $50,000 from the plan to an LSA and then using other funds to
replenish the balance in the section 529 plan.78
The Administration's proposals would expand access to back-
loaded accounts and prohibit further contributions to traditional
IRAs, but would not put an end to front-loaded accounts. The value
of assets held in front-loaded and back-loaded accounts cannot be
compared directly because the former, unlike the latter, must be
discounted to reflect a built-in liability for the tax on future
distributions.79 Although back-loaded accounts may make it easier for
individuals to keep track of their progress toward a specific savings
target, the new ERSAs would continue to be front-loaded unless the
plan permitted employees to elect back-loaded treatment. 80
Accordingly, employees would still have to choose between front-
loaded and back-loaded accounts as the preferred investment vehicle
for their retirement savings. If simplification were a central goal, it
could be achieved by consolidating existing vehicles in a new front-
loaded account without expanding access to back-loaded accounts.
Nevertheless, the Administration's preference for back-loaded
accounts appears to rest on the same "budget-driven tax policy" that
gave rise to Roth IRAs."
Apr. 2004, at 85, 86.
77 See Susan Dynarski, Who Benefits from the Education Saving Incentives?
Income, Educational Expectations and the Value of the 529 and Coverdell, 57 NAT'L
TAX J. 359, 365 (2004). Each state imposes its own lifetime limit on contributions that
can be made to a section 529 plan in the name of a beneficiary. See id. at 361 (noting
lifetime limits ranging from $182,000 to $305,000).
'8 See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF
REVENUE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT'S FISCAL YEAR 2006 BUDGET
PROPOSAL 17 (Joint Comm. Print 2005).
'9 Estimating the present value of assets in a front-loaded account is complicated
by several factors, including uncertainty concerning the length of the accumulation
period and potential future tax rate changes. See generally James M. Poterba, Valuing
Assets in Retirement Saving Accounts, 57 NAT'L TAX J. 489 (2004) (comparing the
value of retirement assets held in tax-deferred accounts and fully taxable accounts).
80 Beginning in 2006, 401(k) and similar plans may allow employees to elect
Roth-type treatment. See I.R.C. § 402A. ERSAs would similarly allow a choice
between front-loaded and back-loaded treatment. See supra note 64.
81 See Steuerle, supra note 57, at 110 (describing back-loaded IRAs as "the by-
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B. Interest Groups
The Administration's savings proposals represent a major policy
initiative with potentially far-reaching ramifications. 2 Nevertheless,
in 2003 when the proposals initially appeared as part of the budget
proposals, the Bush Administration displayed an uncharacteristic lack
of focus and cohesion. Senior Administration officials complained
that they had been "blindsided," 83 and faulted former Treasury
Secretary Paul O'Neill for having failed to consult adequately in
developing the proposals,84 although a senior Treasury official insisted
privately that the proposals had been "fully vetted and considered"
within the Administration.85  The savings proposals met with
resistance from some of the Administration's allies in Congress who
86preferred to move forward with broad pension reform. Moreover, it
quickly became apparent that the Administration had failed to
reconcile the diverse interests of several crucial business
constituencies - mutual funds, life insurance companies, and
qualified plan sponsors - that stood to gain or lose if the proposals
were enacted.
From the outset, the financial services sector enthusiastically
supported the savings proposals, perceiving that management of the
new accounts would generate a bonanza of new business for
product of the bad application of a bad theory to budget-driven tax policy").
Glenn Hubbard, an architect of the proposals and former chairman of the
Council of Economic Advisers, characterized them as "radical, the biggest expansion
of savings incentives on record." Jonathan Weisman, Treasury Renews Campaign for
Tax-Free Savings Accounts, WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 2003, at E01.
83 Id. (describing reaction of White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card and
Budget Director Mitchell Daniels). Budget Director Daniels admitted that he
"didn't... realize how fundamental a difference those proposals, if fully acted on,
would be." Jonathan Weisman, Anti-Tax Crusaders Work for Big Shift, WASH. POST,
June 14, 2003, at A01.
See Jim VandeHei, GOP Not Backing Savings Changes, WASH. POST, Feb. 7,
2003, at A01 (reporting that Administration officials were "laying the blame" on
O'Neill for developing the proposals "in secret"); Weisman, supra note 83, at A01
(quoting Budget Director Daniels as stating that "pure tax policy tended to be sort of
left at Treasury" and was not coordinated with the White House).
85 Weisman, supra note 83, at A01; cf id. (reporting that Budget Director
Daniels attributed inclusion of the proposal in the budget to a "policy hitch").
86 See VandeHei, supra note 84, at A01 (noting concerns of Republican
Congressional leaders that the proposals were "sprung on Republicans with no
forewarning," and would interfere with bipartisan efforts to increase contribution
limits for traditional IRAs and 401(k)s).
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investment advisors.8' As one observer noted, "[i]nvestment advisors,
particularly those with wealthy clients, will benefit because over time,
they will have more money to manage. ' '88  In contrast, the life
insurance industry opposed the proposals, fearing that the new
accounts would undercut the existing market for tax-deferred
annuities and similar products. Frank Keating, president of the
American Council of Life Insurers and former governor of Oklahoma,
derided LSAs as "a spending account, not a savings account," and
warned that such accounts could reduce net savings and divert funds
from 401(k) plans.89 The Administration appears to have been caught
off guard by the controversy over its proposals,90 and has reportedly
considered adding new tax incentives for life insurance products in an
attempt to placate the life insurance industry.9l
Pension lobbying groups also expressed concern that the
proposed new accounts posed a threat to the viability of 401(k)s and
similar qualified employer plans. Because LSAs (and RSAs) would
offer employers (and highly-compensated employees) an escape from
the nondiscrimination rules and other burdens of maintaining a 401(k)
plan, they would erode the relative tax advantages of 401(k)s and
weaken existing incentives for employers to maintain such plans. The
proposals originally specified a contribution limit of $7,500 per
account, which would have allowed a married couple with two
children to contribute up to $45,000 each year. At this level, many
87 See, e.g., Matthew P. Fink, Plan Meets People's Needs, USA TODAY, Feb. 5,
2003, at 12A (statement of ICI President Matthew Fink praising proposals as
"combin[ing] bold innovations with much-needed simplification"); see also Weisman,
supra note 82, at E01 (quoting securities industry representative's characterization of
proposals as "a big priority").
88 Joel Bruckenstein, Behind the New Savings Plans, FIN. ADVISOR, Apr. 2003, at
73.
89 Kranish, supra note 1, at C5 (quoting Keating).
90 Elizabeth Varley, vice president of the Securities Industry Association, noted
that the Administration seemed unprepared for opposition to the proposals and was
slow to respond. According to Varley, "[t]here was a very strong lobbying push by
[the life insurance] industry to ensure that the LSAs did not get a lot of support from
anybody other than Treasury." Id. at C5 (quoting Varley).
91 See Weisman, supra note 82, at E01. Upon leaving her post as Assistant
Secretary for Tax Policy at the Treasury, where she was widely recognized as a
principal architect of the Administration's savings proposals, Pamela Olson returned
to private law practice and was promptly retained by the life insurance industry as a
consultant on the opposite side of the controversy. See Kranish, supra note 1, at C1
(noting that in "classic Washington fashion, the plan's architect has been hired by the
plan's opponent"); id. at C5 (quoting Olson's comment that "[t]here are lots of
strange things that happen in Washington").
Virginia Tax Review [Vol. 25:1101
business owners might prefer to save individually through LSAs and
RSAs instead of sponsoring their own qualified plans. 92 Moreover,
many employees would be tempted to shift their savings into LSAs,
which would allow them to withdraw funds at any time for any
purpose without the early withdrawal penalties or mandatory
distribution rules applicable to 401(k)s. Thus, the pension lobbying
groups viewed the proposals as undermining the linkage between tax
incentives and broad-based retirement security that lies at the heart of
the existing 401(k) system. 93  Not surprisingly, they advocated
providing new tax incentives for the existing pension system rather
than "inventing a flawed new one. 94
92 See Aaron Bernstein, Bush's Retirement Rx is Bad Medicine, Bus. WK.
ONLINE, Feb. 19, 2003, http://www.businessweek.com/careers/content/feb2003/
ca20030218_8886_ca030.htm (noting that companies and experts fear the new plans
would result in less saving for retirement because they "would remove many of the
incentives small-business owners now have to set up 401(k)s or other nontaxable
savings plans for their employees. Even large employers might wind up abandoning
401(k)-type plans in favor of the proposed new ones, leading many employees to stop
saving for retirement."); see also Bruckenstein, supra note 88, at 74 (noting that
employers might prefer to pay regular bonuses to allow employees to fund their own
individual accounts in lieu of an employer-sponsored plan).
93 According to the Profit Sharing/401k Council of America (PSCA), which
represents a broad range of qualified employer plan sponsors,
[t]he proposed changes significantly erode the tax code incentives that
encourage employers to accept the fiduciary obligation and expense that
come with offering a retirement plan.... The current approach links the
availability of tax benefits for decision makers and better off workers with
the retirement savings of lower paid employees. This linkage requires that
employers incentivize lower paid workers to save for retirement by using
expensive matching contributions as well as conducting aggressive
educational campaigns.
Press Release, PSCA, President's Proposals Will Reduce the Appeal of Employer
Plans, Feb. 5, 2003, http://www.psca.org/press/p2OO3/feb5.html (quoting PSCA
president David Wray). As a spokesperson for a pension lobbying group for large
businesses observed, employers were "worried about undercutting our current
retirement system." Bernstein, supra note 92 (quoting ERISA Industry Committee
vice president Janice Gregory).
94 See Bernstein, supra note 92 ("[A] growing chorus of experts say that goal [of
improving pension coverage] might be better served by directing the proposed new
tax cuts into the current system, instead of inventing a flawed new one."). The
proposals represented a "bittersweet victory" for employer groups that had lobbied
for relaxing the nondiscrimination rules and providing "more tax breaks for
employer-sponsored savings plans." Theo Francis & Ellen E. Schultz, Retirement
Savings Proposal Has Small but Significant Changes, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 2003, at A8
(reporting reaction of PSCA vice president Ed Ferrigno).
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The Administration worked closely with the pension lobbying
groups to allay their concerns and enlist support for the savings
proposals.95 One prominent industry group, the American Society of
Pension Professionals and Actuaries (ASPPA), formally withdrew its
opposition when the Administration announced a modified set of
proposals that included reduced contribution limits for LSAs and
96RSAs and relaxed nondiscrimination rules for ERSAs. Specifically,
the ERSA proposals included a design-based safe harbor that would
generally allow lower levels of matching contributions for non-highly-
compensated employees than the existing 401(k) safe harbor.97 The
ERSA proposals also included a more lenient nondiscrimination test
for non-safe-harbor plans, allowing increased contributions for highly-
compensated employees relative to non-highly-compensated
employees. 9' The concessions made by the Administration led
95 See Weisman, supra note 82, at E01 (noting efforts of Treasury officials to
"revive the proposal and make it more palatable politically").
96 The Administration's fiscal year 2005 proposals reduced the annual
contribution limit for LSAs and RSAs from $7,500 to $5,000, and also abandoned
several features of the original proposals relating to qualified defined contribution
plans (e.g., modifying the minimum coverage requirements, repealing the top-heavy
rules, eliminating permitted disparity and cross-testing, and specifying a uniform
definition of compensation), in response to pressure from the pension lobbying
groups. See Press Release, ASPPA, Administration Announces Revised Savings
Proposals - Changes Made to Address ASPPA's Concerns, Feb. 2, 2004,
http://www.aspa.org/archivepages/gac/2004/2004-02-02-savingsproposals.htm (noting
that "many of the revisions to the proposals were made in response to the concerns
raised by ASPPA"); FY 2005 Revenue Proposals, supra note 2, at 10, 16-17; STAFF OF
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE PROVISIONS
CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT'S FISCAL YEAR 2004 BUDGET PROPOSAL 235-37 (Joint
Comm. Print 2003) (describing original proposals).
97 The proposed safe harbor would be satisfied, for example, if an employer
matched 50% of employee contributions up to the first 6% of compensation. See FY
2005 Revenue Proposals, supra note 2, at 17. In contrast, the most lenient design-
based safe harbor under current law requires that the employer match 100% of
employee contributions up to the first 3% of compensation and 50% between 3% and
5% of compensation. I.R.C. § 401(k)(12)(B). Thus, if an employee contributed 6%
of compensation, the required matching contribution would drop from 4% of
compensation under current law (100% on the first 3% and 50% on the next 2%) to
3% of compensation (50% of 6%). Moreover, the proposals would allow a small
employer (with no more than ten employees) to fund an ERSA by making
contributions to a custodial account if the contributions satisfied the safe harbor,
thereby offering relief from ERISA's reporting and fiduciary rules. See FY 2005
Revenue Proposals, supra note 2, at 16.
98 The proposals would modify the nondiscrimination test for 401(k) and similar
plans to allow an average contribution percentage for highly-compensated employees
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ASPPA to endorse the revised proposals, based on its view that they
no longer posed a threat to coverage under qualified employer plans. 99
The revised ERSA proposals thus offered significant inducements
in the form of reduced costs for employers sponsoring qualified
plans.1° The willingness of the pension lobbying groups to embrace
the revised proposals might be viewed either as a sign of successful
bargaining on behalf of employers or as a symptom of a deeper
tension between the "carrot" of tax incentives and the "stick" of plan
regulation in the existing pension system.01  Relaxing the
nondiscrimination rules might encourage employers to expand
qualified plan coverage, even if the plans provide fewer benefits for
low- and moderate-income employees.1 2 However, the advent of
LSAs and RSAs would most likely increase the perceived burden of
the existing nondiscrimination rules and perhaps make employers
more reluctant to shoulder the costs of maintaining qualified plans.103
of up to twice the average contribution percentage for non-highly-compensated
employees if the latter percentage did not exceed 6%. If the average contribution
percentage for non-highly-compensated employees exceeded 6%, no discrimination
test would apply. For example, the proposals would allow highly-compensated
employees to contribute 10% of compensation if non-highly-compensated employees
contributed at least 5% of compensation (in contrast to current law, which would
require that non-highly-compensated employees contribute at least 8% of
compensation). See FY 2005 Revenue Proposals, supra note 2, at 16; I.R.C.
§ 401(k)(3)(A). In addition, the actual deferral percentage (ADP) and actual
contribution percentage (ACP) tests under current law would be repealed. See FY
2005 Revenue Proposals, supra note 2, at 16.
99 See Press Release, ASPPA, supra note 96.
100 See Francis & Schultz, supra note 94, at A8 (noting that proposed changes in
nondiscrimination tests would allow employers to "keep the tax advantages of
offering a retirement plan to their workers, while spending less on them").
101 See Halperin, supra note 22, at 6-7 (describing pension policy in terms of
carrot and stick metaphor).
102 See Press Release, ASPPA, supra note 96 (arguing that the effect of the
ERSA proposals "would be directed most significantly at small businesses where the
need to expand retirement plan coverage (in the majority of cases it does not exist at
all) is most acute"); Robert L. Clark et al., Effects of Nondiscrimination Rules on
Pension Participation, in PRIVATE PENSIONS AND PUBLIC POLICIES 259, 259-60
(William G. Gale et al. eds., 2004) (suggesting that more relaxed nondiscrimination
rules would increase pension coverage and improve benefits for workers at all income
levels); cf William G. Gale & Peter R. Orszag, Whither Pensions? A Brief Analysis of
Portman-Cardin III, 99 TAx NOTES 573, 573 n.4 (Apr. 28, 2003) (noting lack of
empirical support for claims that higher limits and less regulation will expand
coverage or provide meaningful benefits to low- and moderate-income workers).
103 See Burman et al., supra note 6, at 1443; id. at 1439 ("The weaker
nondiscrimination rules are likely to reduce the prevalence of employer matches, thus
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Without a robust set of nondiscrimination rules, the tax subsidy may
fail to achieve the goal of ensuring broad coverage for low- and
moderate-income employees.
C. Interaction with Retirement Policy
The generous tax incentives for qualified plans have traditionally
been justified as a means of encouraging employers to provide
retirement benefits for rank-and-file employees who may undervalue
such benefits.' 4 In recent years, however, Congress has increasingly
embraced a policy of encouraging additional contributions to qualified
plans by high-income employees, while at the same time relaxing
regulatory requirements aimed at ensuring participation by low- and
moderate-income employees.'O' This trend continued in 2001 when
Congress raised the contribution limits for 401(k)s and IRAs.
1 6
Proponents argue that higher contribution limits will encourage
employers to establish plans if they themselves can benefit and that
"more plans mean more retirement savings for the rank and file."'0 7
reducing worker participation even where a firm continues to offer a pension."). The
availability of "safe harbor" 401(k) plans may create a perverse disincentive for
participation by non-highly-compensated employees because the nondiscrimination
test can be satisfied merely by offering a match (even if no employee accepts the
offer). See Daniel I. Halperin & Alicia H. Munnell, Ensuring Retirement Income for
All Workers, in THE EVOLVING PENSION SYSTEM: TRENDS, EFFECTS, AND PROPOSALS
FOR REFORM 155, 168 (William G. Gale et al. eds., 2005) (noting that with the safe
harbor in place, "the employer has nothing to gain from educating reluctant savers
and encouraging them to participate, since the employer's costs increase when
employees choose to participate").
104 See ALICIA H. MUNNELL, THE ECONOMICS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 51 (1982)
("The rationale for the favorable treatment of qualified plans, then, seems to be that
these tax incentives will induce higher-paid employees to save through a mechanism
that will also benefit the rank and file.").
105 See Norman P. Stein & Patricia E. Dilley, Leverage, Linkage, and Leakage:
Problems With the Private Pension System and How They Should Inform the Social
Security Reform Debate, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1369, 1389 (2001) ("Congress has
moved in the direction of higher subsidies for the highly paid and of less regulation -
sweetening the carrot and softening the stick.").
106 See Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No.
107-16, §§ 601(a), 616(a), 115 Stat. 38, 94, 102 (amending I.R.C. §§ 219(b) and
404(a)(3)). The 2001 legislation also included a temporary, nonrefundable "saver's
credit" for low and moderate earners who make voluntary contributions to qualified
retirement plans. See I.R.C. § 25B. See generally William G. Gale et al., The Saver's
Credit: Issues and Options, 103 TAx NOTES 597 (May 3, 2004).
107 MUNNELL & SUNDtN, supra note 10, at 185. On the other hand, "[o]pponents
point out that few workers actually contribute the maximum amount allowed and that
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Annual contribution limits have traditionally been lower for
voluntary contributions to 401(k)s and IRAs than for employer
contributions to other types of pension plans. Underlying this
structure is the familiar observation that voluntary contributions to
401(k)s and IRAs are disproportionately concentrated among high-
income employees, coupled with a policy judgment that it makes sense
to offer employers an additional tax incentive to maintain qualified
plans that provide retirement benefits for employees at all income
levels - especially for low- and moderate-income employees who are
otherwise unlikely to save enough for retirement.' °8 The efficacy of
the structure depends on the willingness of highly-compensated
employees to participate in qualified plans that spread at least part of
the tax subsidy to "reluctant" employees further down the salary
scale. 1°9 This tradeoff becomes even more difficult if high earners are
allowed to accumulate tax-preferred retirement savings through
individual accounts without the restrictions applicable to qualified
plans. From this perspective, any proposal to expand tax incentives
for highly-compensated employees should be carefully designed to
preserve or improve participation and benefits for rank-and-file
employees.1
Quite apart from their potential effects on qualified plans,
proposals to increase contribution limits and relax restrictions on tax-
preferred retirement savings have attracted interest from proponents
of consumption taxation, who see such measures as a preliminary step
toward eliminating capital income generally from the tax base.1
Consumption tax proponents tend to favor allowing all individuals the
opportunity to accumulate tax-free savings without restriction (even if
some choose not to do so), while scaling back burdensome pension
increasing limits would only benefit high-income workers." Id. at 185-86; cf Daniel
Halperin, Employer-Based Retirement Income - the Ideal, the Possible, and the
Reality, 11 ELDER L.J. 37, 68 (2003) (describing this approach as "'trickle-down'
economics at its worst").
'o8 See Halperin, supra note 22, at 3.
109 See id. at 18.
Ito See Halperin & Munnell, supra note 103, at 187-88 ("We adamantly oppose
an increase in tax benefits for retirement savings that does not buy us increased
retirement security for low and moderate earners.").
. See e.g., Theodore R. Groom & John B. Shoven, Deregulating the Private
Pension System, in THE EVOLVING PENSION SYSTEM: TRENDS. EFFECTS, AND
PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 123, 141 (William G. Gale et al. eds., 2005) (arguing that
limiting retirement savings "runs counter to the underlying themes supporting
consumption taxes" and that "costly and redundant regulation" should be reduced to
achieve "maximum flexibility").
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regulation. 12 By weakening the distinction between special-purpose
retirement saving and general all-purpose saving, the Administration's
proposals would move the existing hybrid tax system further away
from an income tax toward a consumption tax and potentially weaken
the existing tax subsidy for qualified plans.
IV. INCOME TAX PERSPECTIVE
From an income tax perspective, the treatment of qualified plans
and IRAs is generally acknowledged as a major tax expenditure."'
Deferring tax (or exempting the yield) on retirement savings
represents a significant departure from an accretion-type income tax
which would tax all income when earned. In contrast, under a
consumption tax, which would exempt the return to saving, a tax on
saved income represents a "negative" tax expenditure.1 4 While the
existing hybrid system features several consumption-type provisions,
the treatment of retirement savings clearly occupies a special position.
The special treatment of retirement savings, with all its revenue costs
and regulatory burdens, can be justified only to the extent that it
provides retirement security for employees at all levels, not just those
at the top of the salary scale. 15
A. Tax Expenditure Analysis
Under traditional tax expenditure analysis, the treatment of
qualified plans and IRAs represents an upside-down subsidy that is
skewed disproportionately in favor of upper-income, high-bracket
112 See id. at 152 (advocating "significant deregulation" and arguing that pension
regulation should be based on the principle of "equal opportunity to participate"
rather than any mandatory level of actual participation).
113 See Halperin, supra note 22, at 46 (referring to this treatment as a "tax
subsidy"); OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ANALYTICAL PERSPEcTIvEs, BUDGET OF
THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2006 324 tbl. 19-3 (2005)
(estimating tax expenditures of $51 billion for qualified employer plans, $48 billion for
401(k)s, and $7 billion for IRAs in 2006). But cf. Zelinsky, supra note 12, at 524
(objecting to the tax expenditure label for qualified plans as "conclusory and
problematic").
' See Daniel N. Shaviro, Rethinking Tax Expenditures and Fiscal Language, 57
TAX L. REV. 187, 221-28 (2004) (discussing Treasury's proposed changes to official
tax expenditure baseline); see also Groom & Shoven, supra note 111, at 137 ("If one
takes consumption as the appropriate tax base, then the current tax treatment of
pensions is exactly appropriate and the tax expenditure of the treatment is zero.").
115 See Halperin, supra note 22, at 8, 46-50 (asking "whether the special tax
treatment of qualified plans can be justified").
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individuals. 116  The tax subsidy is extremely valuable for affluent
individuals who use retirement savings vehicles to shelter substantial
amounts of earned income. However, although qualified plans and
IRAs have attracted vast accumulations of wealth, they have not been
especially effective in increasing retirement saving among lower-
income individuals who encounter difficulty in saving adequately for
retirement. " ' Indeed, if the intended beneficiaries of the subsidy are
lower-income individuals, the tax expenditure might well beo 118
considered a costly failure.
Critics often view tax expenditure analysis as lending itself to a
• • 119
barely concealed agenda of progressive income taxation. In the
pension area, tax expenditure analysis has also been attacked on the
ground that it portrays pension regulation simply as the quid pro quo
for an enormous tax subsidy and thus obscures the paternalistic
underpinnings of such regulation.2 By focusing attention on the
116 See Langbein, supra note 13, at 111 (describing the private pension system as
"top weighted" and "skewed to the affluent because its central mechanism is deferral
and abatement of income taxes").
117 See John Karl Scholz et al., Are Americans Saving "Optimally" for
Retirement? 7-8 (NBER Working Paper No. W10260, 2004) ("The metaphor of the
'three-legged stool,' in which retirement income security is supported by the three
legs of social security, employer-provided pensions, and private wealth accumulation,
appears to apply only to households in the top 70 percent of the lifetime income
distribution because low-income workers lack employer-provided pension
coverage."); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 401(K) PENSION PLANS: MANY TAKE
ADVANTAGE OF OPPORTUNITY TO ENSURE ADEQUATE RETIREMENT INCOME 17
(GAO/HEHS-96-176, 1996) (noting that private pensions provide less than 5% of
income for the bottom quintile).
118 See Halperin & Munnell, supra note 103, at 179-80 (suggesting that the only
feasible option for low-income individuals may be "expansion of Social Security or
the introduction of a government-subsidized retirement savings account," and
concluding that "today's voluntary employer-provided pension system is not capable
of providing coverage for most of those individuals who end up in the bottom two
quintiles of the retirement income distribution").
1'9 See Shaviro, supra note 114, at 204-05 (noting the hostility of conservative
critics to "the liberal political agenda of many liberal supporters of tax expenditure
analysis," and suggesting that critics may have viewed tax expenditure analysis as "a
stalking horse for greater progressivity"); id. at 190 (noting that fiscal language is
"both a purportedly objective descriptive tool and a weapon of political combat").
120 See Zelinsky, supra note 12, at 525 (arguing that tax expenditure analysis fails
to acknowledge the "paternalistic nature" of pension regulation and that "subsidy
rhetoric allows such regulation to be characterized merely as the government
guaranteeing that it receives something for its tax-based assistance"). In fact, most
observers - including those who view the pension system as a tax expenditure -
candidly acknowledge the paternalistic underpinnings of pension regulation. See, e.g.,
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largely formal distinction between taxes and spending, however, tax
expenditure analysis can provide a useful tool for understanding both
budgetary and tax policy. 121  The treatment of retirement savings
illustrates the confusion engendered by failing to recognize the
122
substantive interchangeability of tax cuts and spending. For
beneficiaries of the existing pension system, receiving a tax-free return
on investments in the first place is equivalent to paying tax and then
receiving an offsetting refund, even though the general public may fail
to grasp this functional equvalence.
Tax expenditure analysis also highlights the linkage between
subsidizing retirement savings and raising taxes elsewhere in the
system. Such analysis might even prompt advocates of expanded tax
incentives to confront more directly the budgetary costs and
distributional effects of their proposals, while forcing disclosure of the
role of tax incentives in assessing the overall fairness of the pension
system.124  Although the Administration unfailingly portrays its
savings proposals in terms of promoting national savings and
Halperin, supra note 22, at 3 (suggesting that the paternalistic approach may be
justified for low and moderate earners due to the inability of individuals to foresee
and provide for future needs and the inadequacy of Social Security benefits).
121 See Shaviro, supra note 114, at 219-20 (noting that tax expenditure analysis
exposes "the speciousness of the otherwise prevailing fiscal language distinction
between 'taxes' and 'spending"'). Although a "more varied and informative" tax
expenditure analysis may be desirable on methodological grounds, id. at 219, it is
hardly surprising that the Treasury's efforts to provide an alternative consumption tax
baseline for tax expenditures have met with opposition from income tax proponents.
See id. at 231. Clearly, claiming that the treatment of retirement savings is not a tax
expenditure under a consumption tax baseline is no less a weapon of political combat
than labeling the same treatment as a tax expenditure under an income tax baseline.
12 See id. at 189 (noting that proponents of particular provisions often "exploit
the common tendency to define 'taxes' and 'spending' entirely formally, and yet to
treat the categories as genuinely meaningful").
123 See DANIEL SHAVIRO, WHEN RULES CHANGE: AN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL
ANALYSIS OF TRANSITION RELIEF AND RETROACTIVITY 87 (2000) (describing the
heuristic bias that "induces people to draw an exaggerated distinction between money
that is never paid in to the Treasury and money that is first paid in and then taken
back out"); Shaviro, supra note 114, at 220 (noting that this "endowment effect" leads
the general public to underestimate the cost of tax breaks, while "fthe direct
beneficiaries of tax benefits can readily grasp that an extra dollar in their pockets is a
dollar either way").
124 See Graetz, supra note 18, at 898 n.188 (noting that the distributional
consequences of tax incentives for retirement savings "call into question not only the
fairness of such incentives themselves, but also of the routine practice of ignoring the
existence of such incentives when assessing the overall fairness of our public
retirement security policies").
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improving retirement security, it is impossible to reach an informed
and impartial assessment of those proposals without taking account of
their revenue costs and distributional effects.
B. Distributional Effects
The Administration's savings proposals would channel tax
benefits primarily to a small group of high-income individuals who
already make ample use of tax-preferred savings vehicles.' 25 Even
before the changes enacted in 2001, the benefits of 401(k)s and IRAs
were markedly skewed in favor of high earners, and the trend
continues. 26  In defined contribution plans, both the rate of
participation and the average amount of contributions rise steadily
with income. 21 Similarly, the overwhelming majority of low- and
moderate-income earners do not contribute to IRAs, even though
they are not constrained by the income limits.' 28 To the extent that
higher contribution limits for 401(k)s and IRAs encourage a shift
toward these elective arrangements, the Administration's proposals
are likely to undermine still further the coverage of low- and
129moderate-income employees under qualified employer plans.
125 See Halperin & Munnell, supra note 103, at 187 (finding "not credible" the
notion that "people in the bottom 90 percent or even the bottom 95 percent of the
income distribution are in any way constrained in their retirement saving" by the
contribution and benefit limits in place even before the 2001 changes).
126 In 1996, the top 10% of wage-earning households received approximately
55% of the cumulative benefit of tax deferral on elective contributions to defined
contribution plans, while the bottom 50% of wage-earning households received less
than 10% of the cumulative benefit. David Joulfaian & David Richardson, Who
Takes Advantage of Tax-Deferred Saving Programs? Evidence from Federal Income
Tax Data, 54 NAT'L TAX J. 669, 683 (2001) (measuring distribution of cumulative tax
benefit among wage-earning population and finding a "slightly more egalitarian"
distribution if focus limited to wage-earning contributors); see also Leonard E.
Burman et al., Distributional Effects of Defined Contribution Plans and Individual
Retirement Arrangements, 57 NAT'L TAX J. 671, 678 tbl. 1 (2004) (noting that in 2004,
nearly 50% of tax benefits of defined contribution plans and IRAs went to the top
10% of the income distribution, 70% to the top 20%, and 90% to the top 40%).
127 See Burman et al., supra note 126, at 681 tbl. 4. In 1997, only 6% of employees
earning less than $20,000 - the bottom one-third of earners - participated in 401(k)-
type plans. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 9, at 7 tbl. 3; see also id.
at 9 (noting that only 22% of employees earning less than $20,000 participated in any
type of retirement plan, compared to nearly 80% of employees earning more than
$80,000); id. at 11 tbl. 5 (showing average contributions by income group).
128 See Burman et al., supra note 126, at 682; CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE,
supra note 9, at 8 tbl. 4 (showing 6% overall participation rate in IRAs for 1997).
129 See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 9, at 9-10 (suggesting that
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If the rationale for raising contribution limits is to increase savings
across the board, one would expect to find that many workers are
constrained by the existing limits. Even before 2001, however, only
6% of all participants in 401(k)-type plans contributed the maximum
allowable amount, 3° and those constrained participants were heavily
concentrated in the upper-income levels.13 ' A similar pattern emerged
for IRAs, although IRA contributions are less sensitive to income
levels than 401(k) contributions due to income limits and eligibility
requirements."' Lifting the income limit on IRA contributions would
confer disproportionate benefits on upper-income individuals because
they tend to contribute the maximum allowable amount and derive
the greatest benefits from the tax subsidy.'33 Even the Administration
recognizes that its proposals would provide no benefit to at least half
of the population, since "[o]ne third of all Americans have no assets
available for investment, and another fifth have only negligible
assets. '134
the nondiscrimination rules applicable to 401(k)-type plans "fail to spread the benefits
of the tax incentives among all workers as evenly as is the case for noncontributory
plans").
130 See id. at 12 Table 6. A 2001 study estimated that raising the contribution
limits would benefit only 8% of all participants in defined contribution plans. U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRIVATE PENSIONS: ISSUES OF COVERAGE AND
INCREASING CONTRIBUTION LIMITS FOR DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLANS 4 (GAO-01-
846, 2001).
131 See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 9, at 12 tbl. 6 (showing that,
in 1997, 40% of participants earning $160,000 or more contributed the maximum
allowable amount, compared to 4% of those earning $40,000 to $80,000, and only 2%
of those earning less than $40,000). A 2001 study estimated that nearly three-fourths
of the likely direct beneficiaries of an increase in the dollar limits on combined
employer and employee contributions earned $150,000 or more. U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 130, at 21.
132 In 1997, IRA participation ranged from 2% for individuals earning less than
$20,000 to 17% for those earning $160,000 or more. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET
OFFICE, supra note 9, at 8 tbl. 4. While only 6% of 401(k) participants were
constrained by the contribution limits, 62% of all IRA participants were constrained.
See id. at 12 tbl. 6. Although most high-income households are ineligible to
participate, the tax benefits of IRAs are heavily concentrated at the top of the income
distribution. Burman et al., supra note 126, at 682 tbl. 5 (showing over 80% of tax
benefits going to the top two quintiles, nearly 60% of benefits to the top quintile, and
nearly 35% of benefits to the top 10%).
133 See GRAVELLE, supra note 15, at 12 (noting that lifting the cap would benefit
"the very small fraction of the population" - less than 5% of all taxpayers - with
income in excess of the Roth IRA income limit).
134 FY 2006 Revenue Proposals, supra note 2, at 16.
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The Administration's proposals to increase the contribution limits
and relax the eligibility requirements for back-loaded savings accounts
are aimed primarily at high earners who already save substantial
amounts in tax-preferred retirement vehicles. Removing the $100,000
income limit for conversions from front-loaded to back-loaded
accounts would channel additional tax benefits to high-income
individuals, since only those with earnings above the cap would be
affected. Moreover, those high-income, high-saving individuals are
also likely to be in the best position to engage in sophisticated
planning and exploit the tax sheltering opportunities offered by the
new accounts. For individuals who do not already contribute the
maximum allowable amount to a 401(k) or an IRA, the new accounts
offer no additional incentive for retirement saving. This type of
targeted tax subsidy is inefficient because it rewards high earners who
simply shift assets from taxable vehicles to tax-preferred accounts
while doing little to promote new private retirement saving.
The regressive impact of the Administration's proposals will
become even more pronounced over time, as increasingly large
amounts of capital income are excluded from the tax base. By one
estimate, households with adjusted gross income over $200,000 - the
top 2% - would receive more than 25% of the total tax benefits of
the new accounts, while the bottom 40% would receive around 4% of
the tax benefits. 136 Since upper-income individuals typically receive
larger absolute benefits from tax cuts (absent income limits or
ceilings), the relative benefits can be measured as a percentage of
adjusted gross income (or after-tax income). Assuming plausible
contribution limits, the relative benefits of the new accounts rise
through the income distribution before reaching a peak at the 90th or
95th percentile.' Thus, except for groups at the very top of the
income distribution, the Administration's proposals would generally
redistribute income shares from lower-income individuals to higher-
income individuals. Individuals with moderate income would quickly
... See Burman et al., supra note 6, at 1437 (estimating that conversion of
traditional IRAs to RSAs would cause a one-time increase in after-tax income of
around $12 billion for households with income over $100,000). The amount of the
conversion windfall would depend on the amounts rolled over, the accumulation
period, rates of return on investments, and tax rates. See supra notes 48-56 and
accompanying text.
136 See GRAVELLE & SHVEDOV, supra note 24, at 15.
137 See id. at 16. For taxpayers in the top 5% or 10% of the income distribution,
there is a slight decline in the relative share of tax benefits as a percentage of adjusted
gross income.
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exhaust their ability to shift balances from existing taxable accounts to
the new tax-preferred accounts, exacerbating the regressiveness of the
proposals in later years.138
C. Budgetary Effects
The Administration's savings proposals are designed to conceal
their long-term revenue costs for budget accounting purposes. Under
cash-flow accounting, the LSA and RSA proposals are scored as
raising net revenue of $1.5 billion over a ten-year period, 139 although
they are projected to lose as much as $40 billion of revenue per year
when fully phased in. 14  Both the short-term revenue enhancement
and the long-term revenue loss are attributable mainly to the shift
from front-loaded accounts to back-loaded accounts. Eliminating the
upfront deduction for traditional IRAs and allowing conversions to
back-loaded accounts will accelerate revenue collections in the short
term; by the same token, foregoing the tax that would otherwise have
been imposed on future withdrawals will lead to increasingly large
revenue losses over time.
The revenue costs associated with the Administration's proposals
are relatively small at the outset but grow rapidly over time as the
investment earnings on the new back-loaded accounts compound free
of tax. In the early years, the projected revenue costs of the proposals
are more than offset by temporary revenue gains due to the
termination of new contributions to traditional IRAs and conversions
from existing traditional IRAs to new back-loaded accounts.
4 1
However, those short-term gains will eventually be matched by losses
of equal or greater magnitude, in present value terms, because the
138 After 25 years, the top quintile of the income distribution would receive 80%
of the tax benefits from LSAs under the proposals, and the top 5% would receive
50% of the benefits. See Burman et al., supra note 6, at 1436 tbl. 7.
139 Treasury revenue estimates show a gain of $16.8 billion for fiscal years 2006-
2010 followed by a loss of $15.3 billion for fiscal years 2011-2015, resulting in a net
gain of $1.5 billion for the ten-year period. See FY 2006 Revenue Proposals, supra
note 2, at 159. Revenue estimates prepared by the Joint Committee on Taxation
show a similar pattern. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG.,
ESTIMATED BUDGET EFFECTS OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE
PRESIDENT'S FISCAL YEAR 2006 BUDGET PROPOSAL 1 (Joint Comm. Print 2005)
(showing gain of $14.6 billion followed by loss of $17 billion, for $2.4 billion net loss
over ten years).
140 See GRAVELLE & SHVEDOV, supra note 24, at 5 (extrapolating long-run
steady-state revenue cost of $40 billion per year).
141 See id. at 4.
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accumulated yield on funds diverted from traditional IRAs will noS142
longer be subject to tax upon withdrawal. The short-term gains thus
help to conceal the full costs of the new back-loaded accounts.
Although shifting funds from traditional IRAs to new back-
loaded accounts will temporarily increase tax revenues, the additional
revenues are in effect merely a prepayment of the tax that would
otherwise have been imposed on subsequent distributions from the
original accounts. In theory, assuming a constant tax rate, the timing
of the tax payment should not affect its present value.14 ' Nevertheless,
taxpayers may choose to convert existing front-loaded accounts to
new back-loaded accounts because the new accounts will shelter a
larger after-tax investment and thus reduce the overall tax liability.
144
For example, assume that an individual holds $1 million in a
traditional IRA that will double in value over a ten-year period.
Assuming a marginal tax rate of 30%, a $1 million pre-tax investment
in a traditional IRA is equivalent to an after-tax investment of
$700,000 in an RSA; the remaining $300,000 represents the
government's 30% share of the traditional IRA (including future
investment returns). 146 If the holder chooses to convert to an RSA,
she must pay a $300,000 tax, but in doing so she can buy out the
government's 30% interest on tax-advantaged terms, using funds from
a separate taxable account to pay the tax and transferring the entire
$1 million account balance (rather than only $700,000) to the new
RSA. At the end of the ten-year period, the holder can withdraw the
142 See Burman et al., supra note 6, at 1435. In addition, any new savings that are
shifted from otherwise taxable vehicles into the new back-loaded accounts will give
rise to rapidly accelerating revenue losses over time. See GRAVELLE & SHVEDOV,
supra note 24, at 3 (estimating first year's cost as around 3% of the steady state cost).
143 See Halperin, supra note 33, at 1568 ("Accelerating the tax liability will not
increase the present value of taxes if the reward for early payment is to discount the
tax otherwise due by the after-tax rate of return.").
144 Moreover, under the Administration's proposals, taxpayers who converted
traditional IRAs to RSAs during the first year could obtain an additional tax benefit
by spreading the resulting taxable income ratably over four years with no interest
charge. See FY 2006 Revenue Proposals, supra note 2, at 9.
145 Assuming a 7.2% pre-tax rate of return, the investment will double in value in
approximately ten years.
146 See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text. If the conversion amount were
limited to the after-tax value ($700,000) of the traditional IRA, the RSA balance
would double in value to $1,400,000 and the $300,000 tax collected by the government
would double to $600,000 - the same result, aside from timing differences, as if no
conversion occurred.
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entire $2 million from the RSA free of tax. 47 The conversion allows
the holder to increase her investment in the RSA by $300,000 and
reduce her investment in the separate taxable account by a like
amount. As a result, she escapes paying tax on the investment yield
on $300,000 over the ten-year accumulation period and the
government is left with a corresponding reduction in tax revenue.148
Thus, the conversion not only accelerates revenue from later years to
earlier years but also reduces the net present value of revenue
collected by the government. In effect, the government is forced to
borrow on unfavorable terms and give up more than a dollar of future
revenue in present value terms for every dollar of tax that it collects
on the conversion.
149
It is difficult to predict the short-term revenue gain that would be
generated by conversions from front-loaded accounts to back-loaded
accounts.5 Financial institutions would undoubtedly respond to the
elimination of the income cap by using the tax advantages of
conversions as a marketing tool to attract new business from high-
income customers. Conversions would be especially attractive to risk-
147 Alternatively, suppose that the holder used $300,000 of the withdrawn funds
to pay the conversion tax and transferred only the after-tax amount ($700,000) to the
RSA, leaving an untapped balance of $300,000 in the separate taxable account. Over
the ten-year period, the RSA would double in value to $1,400,000 and the taxable
account would grow to around $490,000 at an after-tax rate of around 5% (rather than
a pre-tax rate of 7.2%). The combined value of the two accounts would thus be only
$1,890,000 at the end of the ten-year period, or $110,000 less than the $2 million value
in the example given in text. The $110,000 difference represents the tax savings
where the entire $1 million balance of the traditional IRA is transferred to the RSA.
148 The foregone tax revenue of $110,000 represents the difference between the
tax-exempt yield on the additional funds transferred to the RSA ($300,000) and the
after-tax yield that would have been generated by those funds if they had remained in
the taxable account ($190,000).
149 See Burman et al., supra note 6, at 1434 (noting that conversions "not only
shift revenues to the present by mortgaging future revenues, they do so at very
unfavorable terms for the government") (emphasis in original). Moreover, the
government will lose additional revenue if the holder earns a higher risk-adjusted rate
of return on investments than the government, because the conversion to an RSA
deprives the government of the opportunity to share in the return on investments in
the traditional IRA. See id. at 1435 n.14; see also supra notes 40-42 and
accompanying text.
150 In 1998, when taxpayers with adjusted gross income below $100,000 became
eligible to convert to Roth IRAs, only around 4% of eligible balances were converted.
See Burman et al., supra note 6, at 1435-36. In the absence of an income cap, the
volume of conversions and the resulting revenue impact would likely be much greater.
See id. at 1436 (estimating that conversions would result in short-term revenue gain of
$37 billion and long-term revenue loss with present value of $49 billion).
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averse taxpayers concerned about a potential rise in future tax rates.
Future tax rate increases would depress the value of traditional IRAs
relative to RSAs, and taxpayers who wished to lock in the benefits of
current low rates could do so by converting from traditional IRAs to
RSAs.15 From an estate planning perspective, the new back-loaded
accounts would also be more attractive than traditional IRAs because
high-income holders would not be required to take any minimum
distributions before death and accordingly could preserve their tax-
free accumulations of wealth intact for their surviving beneficiaries.
151
By expanding tax subsidies and draining long-term revenue, the
Administration's proposals would limit opportunities to achieve
distributional goals. Over time, the new back-loaded accounts would
remove large flows of capital income from the tax base and eventually
lead to higher rates on a narrower base. Moreover, the magnitude of
the revenue losses would become apparent precisely when the
retirement of the baby-boom generation generated urgent new
budgetary pressures. It should come as no surprise that the
Administration's proposals fare poorly under a tax expenditure
analysis within the structure of the existing income tax. What is
perhaps less obvious is that the proposals exhibit equally serious
defects when viewed as a transitional step in the direction of a
consumption tax.
V. CONSUMPTION TAX PERSPECTIVE
The Administration's savings proposals appear to play a central
role in an ambitious tax-cutting agenda that in recent years has
produced income tax rate reductions, expensing of business
investments, estate tax repeal, and reduced rates on dividends and
capital gains. 153 Indeed, some observers see the expansion of tax-
preferred savings accounts as the next logical step in the direction of a
consumption tax. 54 If the ultimate goal is to move from the existing
151 See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
152 See infra notes 193-97 and accompanying text.
153 See Gale & Orszag, supra note 7, at 1228-30 (describing "five easy pieces"
approach).
154 See Mitchell L. Engler & Michael S. Knoll, Simplifying the Transition to a
(Progressive) Consumption Tax, 56 SMU L. REV. 53, 62 (2003) (observing that the
principal change required to move from the existing system to a cash-flow
consumption tax is "expansion of the current tax treatment of qualified [savings]
accounts.., to all investments, in effect providing an unlimited deduction for new
savings"); McCaffery, supra note 5, at 932 ("Practically, all that need be done is to
repeal the limits on traditional IRAs and include debt as income."); Zelinsky, supra
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hybrid income tax system to a workable consumption tax, however,
the transition cannot be accomplished simply by exempting capital
income from the tax base. To achieve the goals of raising national
saving and economic growth, a well-designed consumption tax must
remain revenue neutral, broaden the tax base, reach existing capital,
and provide consistent treatment of capital income and capital155
expense. Unfortunately, in framing its tax-cutting agenda the
Administration has shown no inclination to expend the necessaryS156
political capital to satisfy these requirements. Instead of improving
the existing hybrid tax system, the new back-loaded savings accounts
point in the direction of a flat-rate wage tax with none of the
efficiency gains of a well-designed consumption tax.
157
The existing hybrid income tax has long included various
consumption-type features, most notably the treatment of retirement
savings exemplified by 401(k)s and traditional IRAs. In recent years
tax-preferred treatment has been extended to other special-purpose
vehicles to encourage saving for purposes such as education and
118medical care. Some observers view the Administration's proposals
as merely an "incremental" extension of these provisions, arguing that
"the resulting changes would expand existing patterns of tax-deferred
savings, not initiate new patterns."'59 Nevertheless, in two important
respects the proposals depart dramatically from the traditional tax-
preferred treatment of savings: they weaken the link between the tax
subsidy and special-purpose savings, and they also follow a yield-
exempt model instead of the traditional cash-flow model.16° It may be
note 12, at 520 (describing formal conversion to a cash-flow consumption tax as "the
ultimate step" in an "incremental process" propelled by the expansion of tax-deferred
savings accounts).
155 See Gale & Orszag, supra note 7, at 1220.
156 Cf. Graetz, supra note 5, at 1581 (noting the possibility that the political
process would produce a consumption tax that merely excluded savings from the tax
base without achieving significant base broadening).
157 See MCCAFFERY, supra note 33, at 50 (describing proposed expansion of
back-loaded savings accounts as "steps in the direction of prepaid consumption
taxation" that would make the system "look more and more like a wage tax - the
wrong kind of a consumption tax from a fairness perspective"); Gale & Orszag, supra
note 7, at 1221 (arguing that "recent tax cuts and current proposals do not move the
system toward a well-designed consumption tax or a well-designed wage tax").
158 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
159 Zelinsky, supra note 12, at 515.
1 6 See McCaffery, supra note 5, at 902-03 (noting relaxation of special-purpose
limitations and adoption of back-loaded model as "important recent developments in
the field of ad hoc, prosavings deviations from the income tax").
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true, broadly speaking, that under the existing hybrid system the vast
majority of taxpayers already receive consumption tax treatment for
the bulk of their savings, leaving upper-income taxpayers to bear the
brunt of the income tax on capital income.'6 ' Nevertheless, it borders
on the fanciful to suggest that introducing general purpose back-
loaded savings accounts would inaugurate a smooth and seamless
transition to a normative consumption tax."'
A. Debt-Financed Investments
From a consumption tax perspective, one of the most serious
omissions in the Administration's proposals is the failure to address
the treatment of debt.16' A cash-flow consumption tax would account
for debt by including loan proceeds in income and allowing a
deduction for repayments of interest and principal.6 Equivalent
treatment can be achieved under a yield-exempt model by excluding
loan proceeds but disallowing any deduction for repayments ofS • •165
interest and principal. If loan proceeds are excluded but interest
payments remain deductible, the yield-exempt model would subsidize
capital income instead of producing a zero tax rate.' 66 The treatment
of debt-financed investments would be more generous than under a
consumption tax that provided consistent treatment of interest income
and interest expense.
161 See Zelinsky, supra note 12, at 514-15; id. at 515 (noting that "families in the
bottom half of the income spectrum generally do not undertake financial savings");
see also supra note 134 and accompanying text.
162 See Zelinsky, supra note 12, at 515-16 (arguing that the Administration's
proposals would "institutionalize and reinforce the consumption tax features of the
Code rather than break sharply from current law" and would "move the Code closer
to consumption tax norms").
163 See Roger Gordon et al., Toward a Consumption Tax, and Beyond, 94 AM.
ECON. REV. 161, 161 (2004) (describing failure to address interest deductibility as a
"glaring omission"); Gale & Orszag, supra note 7, at 1227 (noting that the
Administration has embraced proposals to reduce or eliminate tax on interest and
other capital income but has "neither endorsed nor proposed any such restrictions on
deductions for interest payments").
1 See Andrews, supra note 5, at 1153.
165 See Graetz, supra note 5, at 1599-600; Gale & Orszag, supra note 7, at 1227
("A well-designed consumption tax could.., allow for nontaxation of interest income
coupled with nondeductibility of interest payments. The key point is that any well-
designed tax system would treat capital income and capital expenses in a consistent
manner.") (emphasis in original).
166 See Gordon, supra note 163, at 161.
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Exempting capital income from tax while allowing a deduction for
interest payments would create new opportunities for tax arbitrage.
61
For example, an individual could take out a loan and invest the
proceeds in an LSA or RSA with a tax-exempt yield equal to the rate
of interest on the loan. Although the debt-financed investment
obviously yields no pre-tax profit, the transaction would generate tax-
exempt capital income coupled with deductible interest expense and
thus allow individuals to shelter earned income from tax)68  A
comparable result would arise under the existing income tax system if
an individual were allowed to deduct interest on a loan that was taken
• . . 169
out to purchase or carry tax-exempt investments. High-income
individuals are generally better situated to engage in tax arbitrage
because they tend to be financially more sophisticated and have
greater borrowing capacity. By exempting capital income from tax
without curtailing the deduction for interest expense, the
Administration's proposals "would lead not just toward a wage tax,
but toward a wage tax that was only paid by low- and moderate-
income households."
170
B. Effect on Savings
One of the central arguments in favor of a well-designed
consumption tax is that by eliminating taxation of capital income it
would encourage saving and promote economic growth. Similarly, the
Administration seeks to justify its savings proposals on the ground
that they will increase aggregate private saving, even though it
remains far from clear how changes in the after-tax rate of return on
167 See id. at 161 (noting that eliminating tax on interest income while allowing a
deduction for interest expense "vastly expands" tax arbitrage opportunities); see also
Graetz, supra note 18, at 904 (describing tax arbitrage as "the practice of borrowing
and subsequently making deductible interest payments to purchase or carry assets
that produce tax-preferred income").
168 In contrast, a cash-flow model would eliminate the opportunity for tax
arbitrage. The inclusion of loan proceeds would be offset by a deduction for the
original investment, and the tax on the investment return would be offset by a
deduction for repayments of interest and principal on the loan, leaving the taxpayer
with no net profit and no tax reduction.
169 Cf I.R.C. § 265(a)(2) (denying deduction for interest incurred to purchase or
carry tax-exempt obligations); Andrews & Bradford, supra note 3, at 294-96
(discussing limited efficacy of restrictions on deductibility of interest incurred to
purchase or carry tax-favored retirement investments).
170 Gale & Orszag, supra note 7, at 1228.
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investments affect individual saving behavior. 7' The benefits of
expanding opportunities for tax-preferred saving will flow primarily to
high-income earners who are constrained by the 401(k) contribution
limits or the IRA income limits of existing law,7 2 and experience with
universal IRAs from 1981 to 1986 suggests that targeting such
opportunities at high-income earners is unlikely to stimulate
significant new private saving.'73 In analyzing the economic impact of
the Administration's proposals, the Congressional Budget Office
acknowledges that many individuals will simply save the same amount
in the new accounts that they would have saved in existing tax-
preferred accounts, or perhaps shift funds from taxable vehicles into
the new accounts. Such substitution or shifting of assets "would
create no new saving and thus would have no effect on the total
amount of private saving.' 74 Indeed, the proposals might even reduce
net private saving."'
171 See GRAVELLE & SHVEDOV, supra note 24, at 10 (describing the empirical
evidence concerning the relationship between the rate of return and the saving rate as
"mixed, indicating mostly small effects of uncertain dimension"); Annamaria Lusardi
et al., Saving Puzzles and Saving Policies in the United States, 17 OXFORD REV. ECON.
POL'Y 95, 107 (2001) (noting that even if the overall savings rate is too low, tax
incentives targeted at personal saving may be "both expensive and not necessarily
beneficial"); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 78, at 16 (noting that
increasing the after-tax return to saving might cause some individuals to save less
because a lower level of saving would be needed to achieve a future accumulation
"target").
172 The proposed new accounts provide no additional incentive for the vast
majority of individuals (around 95%) who currently fail to take full advantage of tax-
preferred saving opportunities through 401(k)s and IRAs. See GRAVELLE &
SHVEDOV, supra note 24, at 11 (noting that there is "no marginal incentive" for
individuals who already save in excess of contribution limits to substitute additional
saving for current consumption because "the income effect dominates").
173 See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
174 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, AN ANALYSIS OF THE PRESIDENT'S
BUDGETARY PROPOSALS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2006, at 53 (2005) (concluding that
"[m]ost new saving would involve small amounts set aside by taxpayers with few
taxable assets to shift"). After 2015, the proposals might have a "modestly positive"
impact on saving because "more and more taxpayers would run out of assets that
could be shifted." Id.
175 See GRAVELLE & SHVEDOV, supra note 24, at Summary (summarizing
findings that "[n]either theory nor empirical evidence seems to present much of a case
for a significant (or even positive) effect on private savings"); see also Daniel Altman,
Accounts Chock-Full, or a Plan Half Empty?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2003, at C1 (noting
that the Administration's savings proposals "may not increase saving" and citing
skeptical views of leading economists). Moreover, any increase in private saving might
be outweighed by long-term revenue losses, resulting in reduced national saving. See
1140
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A significant feature of traditional IRAs that encourages new
saving is the immediate deduction for contributions. By denying a
deduction for new contributions to LSAs and RSAs and prohibiting
new contributions to traditional IRAs, the Administration's proposals
may well reduce participation by individuals who would otherwise
have been inclined to make contributions to front-loaded accounts.
176
In opting for back-loaded accounts that minimize short-term revenue
costs, the Administration appears to have chosen the model that is
"least likely to increase private savings and most likely to reduce
them." '177 After the tightening of the IRA eligibility requirements in
1986, IRA participation declined even among those who remained
eligible to make deductible contributions. Some proponents of lifting
income limits on IRAs attribute this decline to diminished
promotional activities by financial institutions. They argue that if tax-
preferred accounts were universally available, financial institutions
would respond with an aggressive marketing campaigns that wouldS 178
ultimately induce increased saving at all income levels. In
estimating the likely effects of the Administration's proposals on low-
and moderate-income earners, however, speculation about the
potential trickle-down effects of commercial advertising is no
substitute for rigorous policy analysis. There is a real risk that the
proposed new accounts would merely create a costly new tax shelter
for high-income earners instead of stimulating increased saving.
In assessing the efficiency gains of consumption-type treatment of
savings, a crucial issue involves the treatment of "old" wealth
accumulated before the introduction of the new tax system. In
contrast to a cash-flow consumption tax, which generally reaches old
wealth as well as wages, a yield-exempt consumption tax would not
impose any tax burden on old wealth (absent special transition
GRAVELLE & SHVEDOV, supra note 24, at 12.
176 See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 78, at 16-17 (noting the
argument "that the upfront deduction provides a greater psychological inducement to
save, and that the elimination of traditional IRAs may reduce saving by those who
would have been able to make deductible contributions").
177 GRAVELLE & SHVEDOV, supra note 24, at 12.
178 See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 78, at 16 n.25; see also
Pamela Olson, Ass't. Sec'y. for Tax Policy, Treasury Dep't., Remarks to 2003 ICI/SIA
Retirement Savings Conference (June 2, 2003) (stating that eligibility restrictions
enacted in 1986 generated "complexity" which "sidelined our financial institutions
whose marketing abilities... made the IRA popular and successful," and arguing that
"[g]etting rid of the restrictions and qualifiers simplifies marketing and
participation").
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rules). 179 Accordingly, the particular consumption tax model under
consideration - cash-flow or yield-exempt - may well affect both
the efficiency and the perceived fairness of shifting from an income
tax to a consumption tax. 80 Since old wealth tends to be held
disproportionately by high-income individuals, a cash-flow
consumption tax (without transition relief) may be significantly more
progressive than a yield-exempt consumption tax that raises the same
amount of revenue. By excluding old wealth from the tax base, a
yield-exempt consumption tax would provide a windfall to holders of
old wealth and would generally require higher rates on a narrower
base consisting solely of wage income. The omission of old wealth
from the tax base may also be perceived as unfairly redistributing the
tax burden from older to younger generations who tend to have less
accumulated wealth.
C. Incentives for Retirement Saving
A pure consumption tax would extend tax-exempt treatment to
all savings. As a result, it would no longer be possible to encourage
saving for retirement or other special purposes simply by reducing the
tax rate. Retirement savings would lose their tax-advantaged status
relative to other savings, and it would become increasingly difficult to
enforce the restrictions and requirements that are linked to the tax
subsidy under current law."' Most individuals would probably prefer
the greater liquidity of unrestricted general purpose savings accounts,
and without a strong tax incentive most employers would have little
reason to continue to accept the regulatory burdens of maintaining
qualified plans. Although the Administration's savings proposals stop
179 See Weisbach, supra note 5, at 609; cf Bankman & Fried, supra note 5, at 540
(noting that a cash-flow consumption tax with no exemption for old wealth "would
effectively impose a one-time tax on previously invested capital").
180 See Bankman & Fried, supra note 5, at 565 (noting that a one-time tax on old
wealth accounts for "a significant portion of the efficiency gains" from shifting to a
cash-flow consumption tax and "significantly moderates the regressive effect" of
switching to such a tax, at least at the top of the income scale); see also Weisbach,
supra note 5, at 607 ("The transition tax, which falls on all existing wealth, is a
substantial portion of the tax base in a consumption tax, and elimination of this huge
lump sum tax significantly reduces the efficiency of a consumption tax.").
181 See Daniel I. Halperin & Michael J. Graetz, Comprehensive Tax Reform and
Employee Benefits: The Case of Employment-Based Pensions and Health Insurance, in
TAX REFORM: IMPLICATIONS FOR ECONOMIC SECURITY AND EMPLOYEE BENEFITS 35,
39 (Dallas L. Salisbury ed., 1997) (noting that "there would be great pressure to
remove the restrictions from existing arrangements").
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well short of a full-fledged consumption tax, they would undoubtedly
erode the protective features of existing employment-based
retirement plans and might ultimately undermine the viability of such
plans.
112
To discourage IRA holders from diverting tax-preferred
retirement savings for nonretirement purposes, current law imposes a
10% penalty tax on early withdrawals. The penalty provision applies
to Roth IRAs as well as traditional IRAs, but its deterrent effect is
much weaker for Roth IRAs due to statutory ordering rules which
. ./ . 183
permit tax-free withdrawals of prior contributions. As a result,
Roth IRAs are more susceptible to leakage than traditional IRAs and
are "much closer substitutes for short-term savings not intended for
retirement."1 84  Furthermore, although the 10% penalty tax is
intended to reinforce the special-purpose nature of retirement savings
accounts, it is subject to exceptions which allow individuals to
withdraw funds without penalty to purchase a home or pay for higher
education costs or medical expenses. 18 These "hardship" exceptions
have been criticized for facilitating leakage of retirement savings and
undermining the effectiveness of the tax subsidy.
181
The Administration's proposed new back-loaded accounts would
exacerbate the leakage of retirement savings. 8  In essence, an LSA
182 See Eric M. Engen & William G. Gale, Comprehensive Tax Reform and the
Private Pension System, in TAX REFORM: IMPLICATIONS FOR ECONOMIC SECURITY
AND EMPLOYEE BENEFITS 65, 72 (Dallas L. Salisbury ed., 1997) (noting that "the
reduction in saving due to changes in pensions could substantially or completely offset
an increase in nonpension saving"); Halperin & Graetz, supra note 181, at 39 (noting
that erosion of restrictions on qualified retirement accounts might have "a substantial
adverse effect on the total level of savings").
183 See I.R.C. §§ 72(t), 408A(a). In the case of a Roth IRA, distributions are
treated as nonqualified distributions if they occur before the account holder reaches
age 59 or within five years after the establishment of the account. See I.R.C.
§ 408A(d). A nonqualified distribution does not trigger income inclusion or the 10%
penalty tax until all prior contributions have been recovered tax-free. See I.R.C.
§ 408A(d)(4)(B) (treating distributions as a return of capital to the extent of all prior
contributions). In contrast, early withdrawals from traditional IRAs face "steep tax
burdens" because (with certain exceptions) the entire distribution is taxable as
income and subject to the 10% penalty tax. GRAVELLE, supra note 15, at 4.
184 GRAVELLE, supra note 15, at 5. Early withdrawals can be made more easily
and with lighter penalties from a Roth IRA than a traditional IRA. Id.
185 See I.R.C. § 72(t)(2).
186 See, e.g., Richard L. Kaplan, The Curious Evolution of Individual Retirement
Accounts, 87 TAX NOTES 671, 683 (May 1, 2000) (arguing that exceptions "are
misguided and should be repealed").
187 As the chairman of one financial institution observed, "LSAs target the wrong
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resembles a Roth IRA with no restrictions on early withdrawal; for
individuals over age 58, an RSA would be equivalent to a
supplemental LSA. Indeed, to the extent that easy access to funds
increases the attractiveness of current consumption relative to long-
term saving, LSAs might plausibly be viewed as lifetime spending
accounts.188 For low- and moderate-income individuals, LSAs would
probably emerge as the primary saving vehicle. For high-income
individuals, the preferred investment strategy would be to contribute
the maximum allowable amount each year to LSAs and then to
contribute additional savings to RSAs. Over time political pressure to
relax the restrictions on RSAs might lead to a consolidation of RSAs
and LSAs in a new super-LSA with increased contribution limits and
no restrictions on early withdrawals.
189
D. Accumulating and Transmitting Wealth
The shift from defined benefit plans to defined contribution plans
and IRAs has coincided with a subtle but important shift in the
perceived nature and function of retirement savings. To a large
extent, pension wealth is no longer viewed as a lifetime stream of
annuity payments to meet consumption needs during retirement but
rather as a lump sum of bequeathable capital. If offered the choice,
most individuals elect to withdraw pension benefits in a single lump
sum rather than in the form of a single-life or joint-and-survivor
• 190
annuity. Some observers speculate that the prevalence of lump sum
kind of savings. Because individual savers can withdraw money for any reason at any
time with no penalty, investors will have little incentive to save long-term for financial
security at retirement." PATRICK J. PURCELL, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
RETIREMENT SAVINGS ACCOUNTS: PRESIDENT'S BUDGET PROPOSAL FOR FY2005 6
(2004) (quoting chairman of Principal Financial Group). According to another critic,
"LSAs will harm the retirement security of American families by siphoning long-term
savings into a short-term vehicle where it would be accessed early and often for
nonretirement purposes." Id. (quoting the president of the American Council of Life
Insurers).
188 For low- and moderate-income individuals, it seems unrealistic to expect that
new saving through LSAs would fully compensate for the reduction in retirement
security attributable to reduced coverage and lower benefits under the
Administration's ERSA proposal. See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
189 Alternatively, hardship exceptions similar to those under current law might be
grafted onto RSAs, ostensibly to avoid the deterrent effect of early withdrawal
restrictions. Cf. Engen & Gale, supra note 182, at 71 (noting that lifting restrictions
on early withdrawal of retirement savings could lead to a "consumption boom").
190 See Alicia Munnell et al., The Impact of Defined Contribution Plans on
Bequests, in DEATH AND DOLLARS: THE ROLE OF GIFTS AND BEQUESTS IN AMERICA
[Vol. 25:11011144
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distributions may lead to increased bequests of pension wealth
because individuals who receive lump sum distributions tend to be
reluctant to spend them down. 9' It is also clear, however, that in
assessing their own wealth many individuals have unrealistically
optimistic expectations and fail to understand that they will probably
consume most of their savings during life, leaving little or nothing to
be passed on at death.'9 The Administration's proposals do nothing
to guard against risk that some individuals may squander lump sum
distributions. Instead, the proposed new accounts would reinforce the
notion of retirement savings as a tax-preferred vehicle for
accumulating and transmitting wealth.
The concept of retirement savings as bequeathable wealth
challenges the basic premise of the existing system of retirement
income security. Traditional pension policy encourages retirement
saving by means of a powerful tax incentive in the form of tax deferral
on contributions and investment earnings. The tax incentive is limited
both in amount and in duration, reflecting the goal of ensuring that
individuals will have sufficient income to maintain an adequate
standard of living during retirement. Accordingly, tax deferral for
retirement saving is subject to various restrictions, including a limit on
the maximum amount of annual contributions; above this amount,
individuals can and should be expected to save on their own. In
addition, the minimum distribution rules limit the duration of tax
deferral by requiring that annual distributions commence when the
employee reaches a specified age.193 Indeed, there is a strong
265, 268-72 (Alicia H. Munnell & Annika Sunddn eds., 2003) (discussing the shift
from annuities to lump sum distributions). Since 2000, defined contribution plans
have been allowed to require that employees take distributions in a lump sum. See
T.D. 8900, 2000-38 I.R.B. 279 (2000) (amending Treas. Reg. § 1.411(d)-4 A-2(e) to
allow qualified defined contribution plans to eliminate optional forms of distribution
other than lump sum).
'9' See Munnell et al., supra note 190, at 272 (discussing the impact of "mental
accounts" on spending behavior).
192 See Olivia S. Mitchell, Comment, in DEATH AND DOLLARS: THE ROLE OF
GIFTS AND BEQUESTS IN AMERICA 312, 313 (Alicia H. Munnell & Annika Sund6n
eds., 2003) (noting that while 41% of survey respondents expect to leave bequests of
at least $100,000, "people's intentions are greatly at odds with what may be left by the
time they die"); Patrick Purcell, Retirement Savings and Household Wealth in 2000:
Analysis of Census Bureau Data, 29 J. PENSION PLAN. & COMPLIANCE 48, 65 (2003)
(noting that in 2000, workers age 55 to 64 had a median retirement account balance of
$33,000, which would provide an annuity of $236 per month for a person retiring at
age 65).
193 See I.R.C. §§ 401(a)(9) (requiring minimum distributions), 408(a)(6) (applying
rules to traditional IRAs). Under existing law, the required minimum distributions
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argument that the distribution rules should be tightened to prohibit
tax deferral after the deaths of the employee and his or her surviving
spouse, since at that point the underlying purpose of encouraging
saving for retirement income has run its course. 94 In any event, it
seems incongruous to invoke retirement income security as a
justification for subsidizing the accumulation of wealth that will be
passed from one generation to the next. 195
In effect, the Administration's proposals represent a thinly veiled
assault on the policy of tailoring tax deferral to promote retirement
income security. The new back-loaded accounts are modeled on Roth
IRAs, which are already exempt from the minimum distribution rules
during the holder's lifetime196 and have accordingly become popular in
estate planning circles as a tax-preferred means of transferring wealth
at death. 197  Similarly, the proposed RSAs would allow tax-free
accumulations of wealth with no required minimum distributions
during the holder's lifetime and would therefore function more as a
general savings vehicle than a source of retirement income. Allowing
penalty-free conversions would encourage a flood of retirement
savings out of 401(k)s and traditional IRAs into the new back-loaded
accounts, reducing future lifetime withdrawals from front-loaded
accounts to a trickle. Not only the minimum distribution rules, but
the viability of front-loaded accounts themselves, would come under
increased strain.
More generally, if the Administration's proposals are viewed as
the harbinger of a broader shift toward consumption-type taxation,
they raise serious distributional concerns. One of the most powerful
arguments in favor of a consumption tax is that, unlike an accretion-
may be based on actuarial life expectancies of the employee and a spouse or other
designated beneficiary, thereby allowing tax deferral for a portion of the account
beyond the employee's death. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(9)(A), (B); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.401(a)(9)-5 (2004); see also Zelinsky, supra note 12, at 517 (describing existing
minimum distribution rules as a "minimal impediment to the testamentary
transmission of individual account wealth").
194 See Kaplan, supra note 186, at 683.
195 See Jay A. Soled & Bruce A. Wolk, The Minimum Distribution Rules and
Their Critical Role in Controlling the Floodgates of Qualified Plan Wealth, 2000 BYU
L. REV. 587, 616 (2000).
196 See I.R.C. § 408A(c)(5) (exempting Roth IRAs from minimum distribution
rules).
197 See Kaplan, supra note 186, at 680 (noting that Roth IRAs are "regularly
trumpeted as a planning opportunity of tremendous importance"); Soled & Wolk,
supra note 195, at 596 (describing Roth IRAs as "a new favorite among tax planners
and their clients").
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type income tax, it preserves tax neutrality between immediate andS 198
deferred consumption. The vast majority of individuals consume all
their earnings (and earn all that they consume) over a lifetime without
making or receiving large net wealth transfers; for them, lifetime
saving is essentially equivalent to deferred consumption.99 Moreover,
the cash-flow treatment of retirement savings under current law
allows such individuals to smooth their lifetime consumption and
largely avoid the extra burden of the income tax on saved income.
21 °
Although a cash-flow model is fully compatible with a progressive rate
structure, the yield-exempt model incorporated in the
Administration's proposals is not. Indeed, the back-loaded accounts
proposed by the Administration turn the consumption-smoothing
rationale on its head in order to reward a small but extremely affluent
group of individuals who accumulate more wealth than they consume
over a lifetime.2 °1
Consumption-type taxation is sometimes perceived as inherently
less progressive than accretion-type income taxation because it shifts
the tax burden from upper-income savers to lower-income202
nonsavers. The distributional consequences of switching to a
consumption tax are likely to depend, however, on the nature of
investment assets held by various groups and the treatment of returns
to capital and labor under the particular form of consumption tax.
Instead of exempting all returns to capital, a cash-flow model would
continue to reach inframarginal returns to capital as well as disguised
198 See Andrews, supra note 5, at 1167 (maintaining that the "most sophisticated
argument" for a cash-flow consumption tax is that it "ultimately imposes a more
uniform burden on consumption, whenever it may occur" than does an income tax);
McCaffery, supra note 5, at 811.
199 See Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, A Consumption Tax on Gifts
and Bequests?, 17 VA. TAX REV. 657, 668-69 (1998).
200 By incorporating consumption-type features for special-purpose savings
vehicles, the existing hybrid system targets those savings for tax-favored treatment
based on their intended use. See McCaffery, supra note 5, at 816 (arguing that
"ordinary savings" that are used to smooth out lifetime consumption are
appropriately taxed less heavily than "yield to capital" that enhances lifetime
standards of living).
201 The cash-flow treatment of retirement savings under current law benefits
individuals whose marginal tax rates decline during retirement, but the
Administration's yield-exempt model would have the perverse effect of imposing a
tax penalty on such individuals. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
202 For an argument that the overall welfare gains from implementing a
consumption tax might outweigh any detriment to nonsavers, see Bankman &
Weisbach, supra note 39, at 63-64.
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returns to labor.20 ' If such returns are disproportionately concentrated
at the top of the income scale, a cash-flow consumption tax may be
more progressive than might initially appear.204 Nevertheless, because
unconsumed savings would remain outside the tax base, it might be
difficult to impose sufficiently high marginal rates to achieve the
• 205
desired level of progressivity. Indeed, it is precisely the problem of
indefinite tax deferral through intergenerational wealth transfers that
has prompted interest in retaining a robust wealth transfer tax as a
206
"logical complement" to a cash-flow consumption tax.
Although recent academic literature emphasizes that a cash-flow
consumption tax could be made as progressive as the existing income
207tax, the yield-exempt model adopted by the Administration in its
proposals suggests a markedly different agenda. Yield exemption
would categorically exclude all returns (including inframarginal
returns) to capital from the tax base and thereby exacerbate existing
inequalities in the distribution of wealth. Moreover, because the
yield-exempt model assumes a constant flat tax rate, it stands in
fundamental contradiction to the notion of implementing a
progressive consumption tax. To the extent that the revenue costs of
the Administration's proposals must ultimately be financed from
across-the-board tax increases, the end result will be a clear gain to
high earners (who are in the best position to shift existing savings to
new tax-preferred vehicles) at the expense of low and moderate
earners (who are least able to do so). While it may be tempting for
the Administration to portray its proposals as a broad-based savings
incentive or part of a program of fundamental tax reform, in reality
they amount to little more than a disguised tax cut for high-income
individuals.
203 See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
204 See Bankman & Fried, supra note 5, at 546; William M. Gentry & R. Glenn
Hubbard, Distributional Implications of Introducing a Broad-Based Consumption
Tax, 11 TAX POL'Y & ECON. 1, 38 (James M. Poterba ed., 1997); see also Shaviro,
supra note 39, at 103 (noting that a cash-flow consumption tax can reach
inframarginal returns, which form the "real foundations" of large personal fortunes).
205 See Shaviro, supra note 39, at 113. An income tax might nevertheless be
viewed as "more likely to be progressive in practice" than a consumption tax. Id.
206 BLUEPRINTS, supra note 4, at 125; see also Andrews, supra note 62, at 956-58;
Burke & McCouch, supra note 199, at 699-706.
207 See Shaviro, supra note 39, at 92 (referring to a "new consensus favoring
progressive consumption taxation"); see also Weisbach, supra note 39, at 24-25
(arguing that the choice between income and consumption taxes should turn on
administrative considerations because both taxes are essentially equivalent in terms of
distributional, efficiency, and fairness effects).
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VI. CONCLUSION
In the long run, the Administration's savings proposals would lose
enormous amounts of revenue and produce perverse distributional
consequences. The overall revenue cost would temporarily be
masked by an influx of taxable new contributions and conversions to
the new back-loaded savings accounts, but over time the revenue costs
would increase dramatically as the stream of taxable withdrawals from
front-loaded savings accounts slowed to a trickle and eventually dried
up. The regressive effects of the back-loaded accounts would become
even more pronounced over time as increasingly large flows of capital
income were siphoned off from the tax base. Although ostensibly
intended to promote savings by individuals at all income levels, the
Administration's proposals would channel benefits primarily to those
at the top of the income scale who could shift substantial amounts
from taxable vehicles to the new back-loaded accounts. In light of
experience with universal IRAs in the early 1980s as well as the failure
to address the problem of deductible interest expense, the proposed
back-loaded accounts appear to be conceived less as a broad-based
savings incentive than as a tax shelter for high-income individuals.
In terms of retirement security policy, the Administration's
trickle-down policy of expanding tax-preferred saving opportunities
for high-income individuals seems seriously misguided. As indicated
by the initial reaction from pension plan sponsors and administrators,
the Administration initially formulated its proposals with little
consideration of the implications for qualified plans. The
Administration has failed to acknowledge the inherent tension
between promoting individual saving through unrestricted tax-
preferred accounts and preserving the existing system of employer-
based retirement plans with their delicate balance of tax incentives
and regulatory restrictions. Even with a substantial tax subsidy for
individual savings accounts, however, it may be unrealistic to expect
many low and moderate earners to save adequately on their own. If
employer-based retirement plans are further weakened, such
individuals will become even more dependent on Social Security
benefits just as significant benefit cuts appear increasingly likely.
Despite the Administration's unwillingness to link its savings
proposals explicitly with partial privatization of Social Security, both
initiatives raise similar distributional and fiscal concerns which should
be addressed within the framework of a coherent national retirement
security policy.
Even proponents of moving further in the direction of a
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consumption tax should balk at the Administration's proposed back-
loaded savings accounts. It may be reasonable, on grounds of
administrative convenience, to adopt a yield-exempt approach to deal
with specific problems (e.g., consumer durables and borrowing) within
a cash-flow consumption tax. Nevertheless, the theoretical
equivalence between the cash-flow and yield-exempt models is highly
stylized and cannot accommodate realistic assumptions involving
graduated tax rates or rate changes over time. To the extent that
progressivity is desired in designing a consumption tax, only a cash-
flow model is capable of reaching inframarginal returns to capital as
well as disguised returns to labor. While the Administration's
proposed back-loaded savings accounts appear to be driven largely by
short-term budget considerations, they may also reflect a desire to
introduce an especially regressive form of flat-rate consumption tax
that falls exclusively on labor income. By granting a permanent tax
exemption for capital income without making any of the necessary
painful tradeoffs, the Administration's proposals pose a threat of
lasting damage both to the existing hybrid tax system and to prospects
for fundamental reform.
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